



ISSN 2577-459X (print)
ISSN 2577-4611 (online)

International Relations and Security Studies Review

Volume 1
Number 2
2018

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR PROJECTS IN EDUCATION AND
RESEARCH
SMART SOCIETY - SPIN OFF - UNIVERSITY "G. D'ANUNZIO"
CHIETI-PESCARA

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY STUDIES REVIEW

VOLUME 1 • NUMBER 2 • 2018

I.S.S.N. 2577-459X (print)
I.S.S.N. 2577-4611 (online)

GLOBAL RESEARCH PUBLISHING HOUSE • STOCKTON • CALIFORNIA



International Relations and Security Studies Review

An international peer-reviewed academic journal

Volume 1 / Number 2 / 2018

© 2018 by IVS-UCV- ISPER

International Society for Projects in Education and Research

Smart Society -Spin Off- University "G. d'Anunzio" Chieti-Pescara

International Relations and Security Studies Review (ISSN 2577-459X, e-ISSN: 2577-4611) is published two times a year by Global Research Publishing House, 4930 Moorcroft Circle, Stockton, California, 95206, U.S.A. All papers in this journal have undergone editorial screening and anonymous double blind peer-review.

International Relations and Security Studies Review publishes peer review, high quality original research on applied and theoretical issues related to international relations and security studies and reflects global subjects and cutting-edge theoretical debates. *International Relations and Security Studies Review* aims to combine cutting-edge advances in theory with new empirical findings across a range of fields relevant to the study of international relations and global security. *International Relations and Security Studies Review* seeks to foster an awareness of methodological and epistemological questions in the study of international relations and security studies and to reflect research and developments of a conceptual, normative and empirical nature in all the major sub-areas of the fields.

Editors: Steven M. Ross (Johns Hopkins University)

Pino Arlachi (University of Sassari)

Editor-in-Chief: Ionuț Virgil Șerban (University of Craiova/University of Chieti-Pescara)

Managing Editor: Alexandra Porumbescu (University of Craiova)

Book Reviews Editor: Radu Petcu (University of Craiova)

Deputy Editors: Gianmarco Cifaldi (University of Chieti-Pescara)

Andreea Mihaela Niță (University of Craiova)

Cristina Ilie Goga (University of Craiova)

Email: irssr@yahoo.com; irssr@globalresearchpublishing.com

Global Research Publishing House is an imprint of IVS, California

Please direct subscription, contributions, back-issue requests, and address changes

to: irssr@yahoo.com

Produced in the United States of America

MARKETING

The marketing strategy for *International Relations and Security Studies Review* is designed to maximize the Journal's profile, reach and readership. This is achieved through: targeted electronic marketing to relevant contacts; promotion at conferences globally; highlighting the best content in the Journal; and attracting the best authors to publish in the Journal.

MANUSCRIPT CATEGORIES

International Relations and Security Studies Review publishes research papers, review papers, conference papers, short communications, interviews, and book reviews.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Pino Arlachi, *University of Sassari*

Poulomi Bhadra, *Jindal Global University*

Gianmarco Cifaldi, *University of Chieti-Pescara*

Fedele Cuculo, *University of Chieti-Pescara*

Adrian Dan, *University of Bucharest*

Gabriel Carlos Fava, *University of Buenos Aires*

Mariateresa Gammone, *University of l'Aquila*

Cristina Ilie Goga, *University of Craiova*

Charles A. Khamala, *University of Nairobi*

Lena Lavinas, *Federal University of Rio de Janeiro*

Dolores Mandueño, *University of Buenos Aires*

Pedro Scuro Neto, *University of Leeds*

Andreea Mihaela Nita, *University of Craiova*

Piotr T. Nowakowski, *John Paul II Catholic University*

Seda Attepe Özden, *Başkent Ankara University*

Radu Petcu, *University of Craiova*

Alexandra Porumbescu, *University of Craiova*

Laura Rando, *University of Chieti-Pescara*

Iolanda Romualdi, *University of Chieti-Pescara*

Steven M. Ross, *Johns Hopkins University*

Sanjeev P. Sahni, *Jindal Global University*

Ionut Virgil Serban, *University of Craiova*

Danil N. Sergeev, *Ural State Law University*

Francesco Sidoti, *University of l'Aquila*

Miguel Abel Souto, *University of Santiago de Compostela*

CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY STUDIES REVIEW

SSWR Volume 1 * Number 2 * 2018

DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY IN REGULATING HUMAN MOBILITY	7
<i>Morena Altieri</i>	
REALIST DIPLOMACY IN COLD WAR ERA	14
<i>Alexandra Porumbescu</i>	
ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT	22
<i>Adesoji Oni</i>	
SOCIAL COHESION POLICIES BETWEEN ABSTRACT FORECASTING AND CONCRETE IMPLEMENTATION	33
<i>Salvatore Cimini, Federico Valentini</i>	
THE EVOLUTION OF INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AFTER THE 2008 CRISIS	44
<i>Ionut Serban, Salvatore Puglisi</i>	
INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS	51

Diplomatic activity in regulating human mobility

Morena Altieri^a

^a*University of Naples "L'Orientale", Naples, Italy*

Abstract

Embassies and Consulates are the headquarters of the diplomatic network abroad under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While the Embassy is the diplomatic representation of a State to the country of accreditation, the Consulate is responsible for the assistance and protection of compatriots abroad, as well as the promotion of the representing country. As far as promotional activities are concerned, the functions of a Consulate are very similar to those of an Embassy: they range from the economic-commercial sector to the cultural sector.

The following is an analysis of the different cases in which a fellow citizen, resident or just passing through, may need to contact a Consulate or an Embassy. The analysis will focus not on legislation but on practice, to connote how a diplomatic representation can be of help to a fellow citizen. This case study is therefore characterized by accidents, arrests, detentions, deaths, thefts, kidnappings and child abductions. Starting from the definition of the term "terrorism"; greater depth will be given to the case of attacks and how diplomacy also deals with the fight against international terrorism.

Keywords: *Diplomacy; immigration; humanity; international organization; European Union; embassy.*

Describing the dynamics and above all the challenges that contemporary reality presents to society as a whole and places particular emphasis on the profession of diplomat and, more profoundly, on the very identity of those who cover this role, is not a simple matter. The process of globalization, the fragmentation of distances with the merging of centre and periphery, the increasingly articulated phenomena of immigration and the reappearance of nationalisms and the relative political references that spread over the different democratic scenarios, have multiplied the emergencies. In this context, not only the traditional political-social ties have given way to deep economic and commercial independence, but also the socio-cultural ones, in which the leading role is played not only by governments or their representatives, but especially by the so-called "diplomatic actors".

Among these, the figure of the Embassies and Consulates, is irreplaceable, not only in inter-state relations, acting as an important link between the State it represents and the district of residence, but particularly in those that turn out to be the plots at the transactional level.

The work of the diplomatic realities, is not limited to the assistance of the citizens of the State of which they are guarantors, for any eventuality that occurred during the stay in the territory of the receiving State, but also aims with commitment and above all to

promote trade between one and the other State, as well as the purpose of developing cultural relations between countries concerned.

In the event of a difficult or emergency situation in which a fellow compatriot remains involved, the Consulate or the Embassy will promptly activate a network of assistance. First, a verification activity is carried out in order to clarify what happened, in order to obtain reliable information, through various sources released by local authorities or judicial authorities.

The contact with local authorities is a very important activity for cases of assistance: contact completely implicit because the local authorities usually warn the diplomatic realities.

In cases of assistance, it is necessary for the Consulate to contact the relatives of the compatriot, before they learn certain news from the media.

More in detail, this is how a diplomatic institution intervenes in some cases of consular assistance.

In case of accidents, in which the compatriot is injured, the Consulate and/or Embassy organizes the repatriation by air-ambulance. In the case of hospitalizations, close contact is made with the local hospital facilities.

In the event of the arrest or detention of a fellow compatriot abroad, the Consulate may exercise visiting rights. In addition, it intervenes with local authorities to improve the situation of the arrested or detained person (such as facilitating family visits), to obtain a shift of cells or to bring necessities.

In the event of the death of compatriots, the Consulate, in addition to organizing the repatriation of the body, takes care of all related activities (reception of family members who arrive in the host country).

In the event of theft, however, the Consulate issues an "Emergency Travel Document"; the document that allows the compatriot to make the journey back to their country of residence.

The case of kidnapping, on the other hand, is very particular, as it can be of a terrorist or extortionary nature. One of the most emblematic cases to which greater attention is given, also because of the great media attention.

Another frequent case is that of the abduction of the child by one of the parents: of vital importance is the collaboration of the trusted lawyer with the diplomatic reality, to be able to know well and frame the local legislation and direct the best parent compatriot.

However, this is a considerable use of resources, in order to increase the pressure on local authorities and achieve maximum collaboration.

1. Definition of the term "Terrorism"

International terrorism constitutes one of the most complex phenomena in contemporary history, from the point of view of analysis, understanding and, above all, with regard to the fight against the phenomenon.

Its legal definition is also difficult to understand.

Terrorism is generally identified in the set of criminal activities carried out in order to spread panic among individuals, groups of persons or an entire community, and therefore to pursue further purposes, generally of a political nature (Panzer, 1978: p. 1). It is characterized by the presence of two elements, such as the illicit conduct, which consists in a crime of extreme gravity directed against persons and goods, and its transnational nature,

which, by some authors, considered in *re ipsa* to the terrorist act itself (Cherubini, Terrorismo (diritto internazionale), in Enciclopedia del diritto, Annali V, 2012: p. 1214).

The phenomenon, by its nature, does not remain confined within the national limits, but is of inter and transnational character.

According to two American scholars, James and Brenda Lutz, there are six elements necessary to be able to talk about terrorism, such as:

- 1) The use of violence or the threat thereof;
- 2) Violence must be perpetrated by an organized group;
- 3) The existence of a political objective;
- 4) Violence is directed towards a very wide public, which goes beyond the direct victims, often-innocent civilians;
- 5) At least one of the actors involved does not perform governmental functions;
- 6) Terrorism is "weapon of the weak" (Foradori, 2011: p. 304).

Throughout history, terrorism has assumed ever new connotations and has been identified in "terrorist networks"; which differ according to the time and time in question: Initially, it was considered that the phenomenon was nationalist/separatist (Foradori, 2011: p. 305), where the objective of the network was to use violence to gain control over a given territory and uninstall the existing state authority; since the 1960s and 1970s, they have been characterized by the advance of terrorist groups of neo-Marxist and nationalist inspiration, whose aim was to overturn the current political-economic order in order to establish a completely alternative system; later, in the 1980s, what is called "terrorism of the Islamic movements" (Di Stasio, 2010: p. 85); made its appearance on the international scene. The project has developed in most Muslim countries, especially in Egypt, Gaza, Lebanon and the West Bank.

The Islamic religion has today assumed two opposite connotations: that of the bloody religious fanaticism, and that of the religion of harmony that takes sides against the falsity of the western reality (Şerban 2018: 23-30), as instead claimed by the Muslims who proclaim themselves "moderate".

Returning to the definition of terrorism, it is important to point out that it is customary to specify its international character in order to be able to distinguish it from the classic internal crime, with which it shares the purpose of intimidation of the authorities and the subversion of the state political balance of a Country in which the criminal activity is committed, but from which it distinguishes itself with foreign centres of power.

The first legal definition, in fact, dates back to the Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism of 1937, drawn up in reaction to the killing of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs L. Barthou in Marseille in 1934, which states that terrorism consists of a set of crimes directed against a State and whose main purpose or nature consists in provoking terror in certain persons, groups of persons or the public.

Terrorism is not only difficult to identify but to "conceptualize": it represents a different phenomenon from the traditional war to which the States have always been accustomed; it does not provide for the clash between organized armies, it does not turn against a State, it does not avail itself of pre-established rules and it is not "predictable".

It is therefore the exact opposite of the classical war, like the First and Second World Wars, and it is precisely for this reason that regional and international organizations, as well as states, have found it very difficult to deal with a different threat than those to which they were accustomed.

International cooperation in the fight against terrorism

The fight against terrorism is associated with the activities of Bodies or Administrations, such as the Minister of Justice, the Minister of the Interior, the various Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies, which daily contrast such phenomena in collaboration with the analogous organizations of the partner Countries.

However, in addition to the security sector, diplomacy also plays a fundamental role in the fight against international terrorism.

In order to define the current nature of the threat, the very concept of the “fight against international terrorism”; needs to be framed in a meaningful way. The main threats to security, in addition to terrorism, stem today from a series of increasingly interlinked processes, such as trafficking in human beings, trafficking in migrants, organised crime, illicit trafficking in arms, drugs, cultural goods, money laundering and corruption.

Therefore, it is not possible to speak only of international terrorism in itself, but of the interconnection with crime, illicit trafficking, all of which have a very specific aim: the weakening of state structures¹.

It should also be noted that the location has changed and that the geographical extent of this phenomenon has increased. In fact, terrorist formations have been born, and becoming more and more active, in opposition and completely concurrent. For example, as opposed to Al Qaeda, which has as its range of action the Afghan-Pakistani chessboards, are regions such as Syria, Iraq, the Middle East, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria, Yemen and the Horn of Africa. Alternatively, names such as ISIS, AL SHABAAT, AL MORABITOUN² have begun to have roles increasingly active and known to the public.

Terrorist networks prove to be phenomena, which are difficult to detect, because they are transnational. In fact, characteristic of the so-called foreign fighters are the activities following the training received from the organized terrorist groups present in the operative theatres and which they carry out once they have entered or returned to their Countries of origin: radicalization, self-reclusion and fragmentation are the most felt and connected aspects. Much more frequent are the terrorist threats, not by organized structures, but by small groups, self-activated and formed after a process of radicalization.

There is also another practice that has grown considerably: kidnap for ransom. This issue is the subject of attention to international level in the main forums: ONU (Resolution 2133 of January 2014), EU (Foreign Affairs Council, June 2014), G8 (Lough Erne Summit - Lyon Rome Group, 2013), GCTF (The Glob Counter Terrorism Forum).

Within the United Nations, the “Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy determines the focus of reference.

Adopted in 2006 by the General Assembly, it has four fundamental objectives³:

¹ It has called the comprehensive approach, which takes into account the ever-increasing interconnections between organized crime networks, terrorist networks and illicit trafficking.

² Known as the foreign fighters, phenomena such as radicalization, self-empowerment, self-activation and fragmentation of terrorism, kidnapping for ransom purposes.

³ Collective action is the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its Additional Protocols, known as the “Palermo Convention”, year 2000.

The signing in Palermo made Italy the center and symbol of the fight against transnational criminal organizations, so much so that on the 22nd Commission for the Prevention of Crime and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ), held in Vienna in April 2014, the Italian delegation presented a resolution in the affirmation of the Convention itself. “Renewed efforts to ensure the effective implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols there to on the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention”.

1. Address the conditions for its dissemination;
2. Prevent and combat the phenomenon;
3. Strengthen the capacities of States for prevention and law enforcement and strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard;
4. Ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law as a fundamental basis for counter-terrorism.

The Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is another instrument to combat corruption (Signed in Merida, Mexico, year 2003).

The Glob Counter Terrorism Forum, launched in New York in September 2011, brought together 30 founding members for the fight against international terrorism. At the initiative of the USA, the following countries met: members of the G8; Turkey; Spain; the Netherlands; Denmark; Switzerland; the Arab countries (United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia; Qatar, Morocco, Egypt; Jordan; Algeria); African (Nigeria, South Africa); Asian (Indonesia, Pakistan, China, India); South American (Colombia); and Oceania (New Zealand, Australia).

The role of the GCTF is strategic, especially in recent years, in the context of international counter-terrorism policy, identification and sharing, in a common way of acting.

Founded in October 2001 after the attack of September 11, the Rome-Lyon Group was formed by the merger of the Rome Group, on anti-terrorism and the Lyon Group, on the fight against international crime: it is therefore specifically dedicated to crime, illicit trafficking and clearly the fight against terrorism, with the aim of developing shared and collaborative practical tools from a strategic and political point of view⁴.

The European Union, on the other hand, has dedicated a specific working group, called COTER, to the fight against international terrorism (Şerban 2018: pp. 232). It meets monthly in Brussels under the Presidency of the Council of the Union. Security threats are examined and sharing and contrast tools are provided (Altieri and Cifaldi 2018: pp. 56-64).

One of the most operative and concrete instruments to combat the aforementioned phenomena is represented by the Black Lists⁵, in which the organizations and individuals considered terrorist are included, protagonists of sanctions such as the Visa Ban, the Travel Ban or the Assets Freezing (freezing of assets, bank accounts, financial activities and monitoring of the financial transitions of the subjects).

2. Future developments

The use of international coordination instruments is essential. Terrorism becomes a failed challenge if we lose sight of the priority need to challenge it with its own means: adaptability, Trans nationality, flexibility.

The protection of public security must not become a reason for psychological terrorism campaigns, which are designed to ensure increasingly effective social control. We need to build on our values, principles and rights: to protect them and make them our strength.

This makes it necessary to promote and encourage forms of cross-border cooperation. This is why, from an architectural point of view of the fight against terrorism,

⁴ Following the crisis in Ukraine, Rome-Lyon is suspended, as is the G8 exercise.

⁵ There are regulations, the 2580 of 2001 and the 881 of 2002, which constitute the Black Lists where the subjects subject to sanction are inserted.

diplomacy is needed and diplomats are needed to create valid instruments for tracing and making people vulnerable.

On the long term, policies to prevent terrorism must be based on strengthening intercultural dialogue, education and social integration. Police cooperation and the exchange of information between Member States should be encouraged and the fight against all forms of financing of terrorist networks should be pursued so that they can be definitively dismantled.

References

Altieri, L. and Cifaldi, G. (2018) "Big data, privacy and information security in the European Union", *Sociology and Social Work Review*, no. 1, vol. 2, 56-64.

Baldi, Stefano and Nesi, Giuseppe, eds. (2015) "Diplomatici in azione. Aspetti giuridici e politici della prassi diplomatica nel mondo contemporaneo", *Quaderni della Facoltà di Giurisprudenza*; 7, Trento: Università degli studi di Trento

Balice, S. (2003) *La lotta al terrorismo nell'Unione Europea, 2003*, [online] Available: <http://files.studiperlapace.it/>.

Balsamo, A. (2015) *Decreto Antiterrorismo e riforma del sistema delle misure di prevenzione*, [online] Available: <http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/>.

Barak, A. (2009) "Lectio magistralis. I diritti umani in tempi di terrorismo. Il punto di vista del giudice", Moccia, S., *I diritti fondamentali della persona alle prove dell'emergenza*, Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane.

Barberini, R. (2004) "La definizione di terrorismo internazionale e gli strumenti giuridici per contrastarlo", *Rivista Italiana di Intelligence*, N.28 Gen.-Apr.2004.

Bassu, C. (2010) *Terrorismo e costituzionalismo*, Torino: Giappichelli.

Bastiani, D. (2012) *Terrorismo e Media. La Comunicazione del Terrore*, [online] Available: https://www.difesa.it/InformazioniDellaDifesa/periodico/periodico_2012/Documents/R2_2012/36_43_R2_2012.pdf.

Bradani, A. (2006) "Aspetti politici e legali della lotta al terrorismo", F. Cappè-F. Marelli-A. Zappalà (a cura di), *La minaccia del terrorismo e le risposte dell'antiterrorismo*, Milano: FrancoAngeli.

Califano, L. (2013) *Privacy e Sicurezza*, [online] Available: <http://www.democraziaesicurezza.it>.

Cherubini, F. (2012) "Terrorismo (diritto internazionale)", *Enciclopedia del diritto, Annali V*, Milano: Giuffrè.

Conforti, B. (2018) *Diritto internazionale*, Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica.

Conforti, B., Focarelli, C. (2017) *Le Nazioni Unite*, XI ed., Padova: CEDAM.

De Vergottini, G. (2004) *La difficile convivenza fra libertà e sicurezza: la risposta delle democrazie al terrorismo. Gli ordinamenti nazionali*, [online] Available: <http://archivio.rivistaaic.it/>.

Di Majo, L. (2015) *Le misure di contrasto al terrorismo internazionale: contenuti e novità*, [online] Available: <http://www.democraziaesicurezza.it/>.

Di Stasio, C. (2010) *La lotta multilivello al terrorismo internazionale. Garanzia di sicurezza versus tutela dei diritti fondamentali*, Milano: Giuffrè.

Feola, A. (2013) *La lotta al terrorismo: Misure di contrasto in ambito nazionale ed internazionale*, [online] Available: <http://www.difesa.it/>

Foradori, P. (2011) "Gli attori non-statali e la proliferazione delle armi di distruzione di massa. Il caso del terrorismo nucleare", *Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia, Rivista trimestrale fondata da Camillo Pellizzi*, 2/2011, 301-322.

Macrillo', A. (2010) *Eurojust e l'attuazione degli accordi Onu contro il crimine organizzato transnazionale*.

Megie, A. (2010) "La scène terroriste: réflexions théoriques autour de l'ancien' et du 'nouveau' terrorisme", *Revue canadienne de science politique*, 43, décembre 2010, 983-1003.

Panzerà, A. (1978) *Attività terroristiche e diritto internazionale*, Napoli: Jovene.

Portesi, S. (2004) "Potential application of advances in technology to prevention and response to cases of terrorism and criminality: the role of information and communication technologies", *Cyberspazio e Diritto*, Vol. 5, n. 2, July 2004.

Șerban, I. (2018) "European Union regulations on combating the terrorism". In *Forum on Studies of Society. Second edition*, Bucharest: Pro Universitaria, 231-238.

Șerban, I. (2018) "Western societies and the fight against terrorism and hate crimes", *International Relations and Security Studies Review*, April, 23-30.

Sinagra, A. (2005) "Terrorismo e legittima resistenza", *Rivista della Cooperazione giuridica internazionale*.

Sossai, M. (2012) *La prevenzione del terrorismo nel diritto internazionale*, Torino: Giappichelli.

Trahan, J. (2002) *Terrorism Conventions: existing gaps and different approaches*, 8 New Eng. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 215 (2002).

Realist diplomacy in the Cold War era

Alexandra Porumbescu^{a*}

^a *University of Craiova, Craiova, Romania*

Abstract

This paper addresses the theme of the Cold War, especially the role of the diplomatic approaches to the use of nuclear weapons and the role they had in international relations during this period. Throughout history, we have had to deal with the struggle between ideologies and the political involvement of this struggle. The conflict of the Cold War is no different in this respect, being a struggle between communism and democracy at the ideological level. Moreover, the conflict is complex and can be approached from several points of view, from ideological conflict, to military conflict, or to a conflict between civilizations and cultures. The Cold War has left visible consequences for the world in which we live today, remodelling Europe's composition and its role in international politics.

Keywords: *Realism; Cold War; security; defense; power.*

1. The realist approach of the Cold War

Realism is one of the main theoretical frameworks in the study of international politics. David Anderson notes that realism is not beyond critics, but ever since the great Greek historians, it had the ability to provide a behavior paradigm of rational cost-benefit calculations regarding national interest in a mainly anarchic international environment (Anderson, 2001: p.2).

The realists subscribe to a number of central statements regarding the nature of international politics: the international system is centered on states, the international system is characterized by anarchy and it is a system based on self-help (Waltz, 2006: pp. 91-92). While international politics is a source of constant conflict among states in order to acquire more power, this concept is explained by realists such as Hans Morgenthau as the struggle of great nations to obtain relative power in the detriment of their rivals: "When regarding the power of a nation by saying that one is very strong while another one is weak, we always presume a comparison...Neglecting this relative character of power and treating it as absolute is one of the most elementary and frequent mistakes in international politics" (Morgenthau, 1948: p. 174).

In the realist theory of international relations, the security dilemma is caused by the competition for security among the great powers. Although they agree to the main assumptions of realism, offensive and defensive realists disagree on several significant issues, one of the most important ones being whether seeking to acquire hegemony is a wise strategy (Layne, 2011: p. 74). According to David Anderson's description of the Cold War, the anarchy was caused by the vacuum of power left behind by the Second World

* Alexandra Porumbescu. *E-mail address:* alexandraporumbescu@yahoo.com.

War that called to be filled, but, at the same time, states were concerned with their own economic and security issues, thus balancing the costs of another conflict in a precarious economic situation with the danger of the expanding power of some states. In an anarchic international system, the great powers are facing the need to obtain a leverage on their rivals (Morgenthau, 1948: p. 175), situation that started the arming race of the Cold War, but at the same time created a competition for security, where prudence in conducting diplomatic relations was felt throughout the entire Cold War era. "The balance of power was established after the Second World War and during the Cold War between two poles, two very powerful countries in militarily, economically and ideologically, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R" (Serban, 2013: p. 57).

Realists claim that by the human nature, people are motivated to try to dominate others, the same principle being applied to states, thus transforming the policy of nations into a tacit power struggle, and realpolitik into a network required for survival. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow surmise the "essence of classic realism that begins with the two basic postulates of the RAM: namely that unitary states are key players in international affairs, and that states act rationally, calculating the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action and choosing action that maximizes their usefulness. The international environment is a jungle, as Thomas Hobbes explained, in which the aggressive behavior of an animal against the other is a normal fact in the absence of any other supreme authority, and the predominant goals pursued by states in political life are security and power" (Allison, Zelikow, 2010: p. 39). Diplomat George Kennan believes that the realities included dependence on a balance of state power in Europe in order to prevent any power from dominating the Eurasian territorial mass, which is why the US entered the Second World War and after the end of the war it helped begin the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan. Therefore, the US' decision to completely end its isolationist policy and the ending of traditions with European countries was a step in favor of US security. It did not want hegemony on the European territory, but rather to create a balance of power that could be unbalanced by the military rise of the USSR.

Later, Kennan clarified the paradigm of interstate action, writing that "the interests are essentially connected to military security, the integrity of political life and the good state of the people". The government needs to reasonably identify these needs and then put "the commitments and mistakes assumed by someone in a reasonable relationship with the real possibilities they have to act in the international environment" (McKeown, 2001: p. 1172).

The bipolarity of power distribution has contributed to maintaining the conflict at the level of ideologies, given that a more or less equal distribution of power is preferable in exchange for the gathering of power in the hands of a single state. Looking back, the arming race and the implicit issue of nuclear weapons has led to increased states' security, balancing the "defensive-offensive balance" of the military capabilities of the great powers (Taliaferro, 2000: p. 136). Defensive realists assert that the advantage is usually on the defensive side, which means that the great powers should be confident that others will not attack them (Layne, 2011: p. 74)

That is why we can explain the duality of the Cold War relations which, on the one hand, represented the desire of states to eliminate or at least control nuclear weapons, and on the other hand, there are the weapons-related operations they carry out. The fact that both great powers, both the US and the USSR, have become actors of the nuclear era has

been a benefit, from a realistic point of view, to preserving international security. The existence of nuclear weapons could not be denied, not so much the danger of their use by the states holding it. Therefore, the only realistic solution of a competing power remains the enrolment in the arms race.

The strategies of the great powers can be divided into two realistic categories: on the one hand, we have the actions of the United States of America that can be analysed in terms of defensive realism, and on the other hand the Soviet Union finds its actions to be analysed from the perspective of offensive realism.

2. Defensive Realism

Although the United States has adopted an isolation perspective for a certain amount of time, having the advantage of both geographic and technological factors, the Cold War period brings changes to the US government's strategy. To prevent the existence of a single power in a Europe threatened by Soviet expansion, the US had to expand its "umbrella" on European states. The US believes that security is in the international space but it is not achieved through expansionist actions, and the defensive realists argue that the great powers adopting great strategies to maximize power end up enjoying less, not more security.

The goal of the American foreign policy was to conclude international relations with European states by offering them a guarantee of security. Through these actions, the danger of the USSR's enlargement was diminished and diplomatic relations deepened.

Defensive realists consider that the main cause of insecurity in expansionist strategies is, first of all, the increase in costs, even in the case of successful expansions, weakening the internal economic base of the state (Kennedy, 2011), fact that is also demonstrated by the political evolution of the USSR during the Cold War, due to its attempts to reform the system for economic recovery.

Furthermore, one of the main rules in international politics is that "instead of allying with a potential hegemon, other great powers unite their forces to defeat it by strengthening their own military capabilities and / or forming counterhegemonic alliances" (Layne, 2011: p. 75). The goal of the Americans was to increase economic interdependence between states through economic aid programs and the perpetuation of democracy. Thus, we are able to identify another component of the duality that the Cold War was built upon, namely the one between the security concepts of the great powers to dictate the world order: on the one hand, the US regarded security as existing within the interstate relations, while the USSR considered security could only be provided by expansion and maximization of power.

3. Offensive Realism

The USSR during the Cold War era can be describe as having a foreign policy dominated by offensive realism, which, unlike the defensive, implies that a state can only achieve a certain level of security by pursuing an offensive strategy by which the aim is to maximize its power and influence its rivals (Layne, 2011: p. 75).

Unlike the defensive realists, who claim that the great expansionist strategies are causing the emergence of security dilemmas, the offensive realists consider such strategies to be a logical consequence of the state of insecurity (Posen, 1986: pp. 16-19).

One of the most significant statements in offensive realism is John Mearsheimer's work, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, in which he argues that expanding and maximizing power are the only strategies that allow great powers to gain security. As Mearsheimer

states, "States quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to become the most powerful state in the system" (Mearsheimer, 2001: p.33). Mearsheimer thus sees the justification of the action of a power to seek the status of a hegemon in the search for security "the search for power ceases only when hegemon status is obtained ... the best means of guaranteeing its security is to become the hegemon at present, so any possibility of a challenge by another great power is removed" (Mearsheimer, 2001: pp. 34-35).

Through the lenses of offensive realism, we can analyse the actions taken by the USSR in Europe, considering them even necessary in order to ensure the interests of the state. Tellis states that "no state can be sure that competing states will not use their military capabilities to threaten their existence and autonomy, each is compelled to try to eliminate or subdue its competitors before they have a similar fate" (Tellis, 1984: p. 381).

The purpose of analysing the actions of the great powers through theories of international relations is not to find the state in fault or the right one; the aim is to look at their actions from a perspective that offers certain patterns and to try to understand what led to the unfolding of the Cold War in the way it evolved.

4. Diplomatic relations and strategies during the Cold War

The emergence of nuclear weapons has led to a drastic reconsideration of the role that war has ever had in international politics and implicitly has led to the change of strategies. As Bernard Brodie wrote, "the ultimate goal of our military strategy was to win the war, from now on it would be to avoid war" (Brodie, 1959)

The Cold War period is characterized by multiple interstate relations that have kept countries in a continuous correlation and prevented a possible nuclear attack in an era marked by constant threats from states with atomic weapons.

The Cold War diplomacy has had major themes in the arms race, the conclusion of strategic alliances and the discrepancy between the ideologies and policies of the two superpowers. Stalin reinstated a policy of confrontation with the West because he understood that the communist party he was able to crown could not be sustained in an international or domestic context dedicated to peaceful coexistence (Kissinger, 2007: p. 388). Therefore, he needed to set up an orbit of satellites to strengthen its power in order to prepare for an inevitable diplomatic display of forces.

H. Kissinger reports a short conversation with Truman in which he captures the entire American thread, namely America's call to serve as a reservoir of freedom and progress for all mankind: "We have completely defeated our enemies and made them surrender. After that, we helped them recover, become democrats and re-enter the community of nations. Only America could do this" (Kissinger, 2007: p. 376).

After several unsuccessful encounters between Stalin and the American Secretary of State, Marshall, the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Alliance, and the Warsaw Pact were discussed, in response to Stalin's actions, which lead to distrust from the Americans. According to Kissinger, America opted for Western unity in the East-West negotiations. Indeed, little choice was left, because no one dared to take the risk of following Stalin's suggestions, just to find out that he was using negotiations to undermine the new international order that America was trying to build. Thus, fencing has become the guiding principle of Western politics, and so has remained for the next forty years.

The Marshall Plan was the financial aid America offered in an attempt to rebuild the European economy rejected by the USSR and its satellites. It assumed that the United States could safely focus on European economic reconstruction, while postponing any

Russian offensive with forces, as it intimidated them at the same time as the atomic bomb (Gaddis, 2009: p. 51).

The North-Atlantic Treaty was initiated at the initiative of America, and as a result of the desire of states to maintain peace and defend their independence. The Treaty provided them with the necessary military force to respond to any aggression against them or its Member States.

The Warsaw Pact was the USSR's response to the NATO initiative of America and represented a military force of the Eastern European countries. The declared goal of the pact was the desire of countries to defend them against NATO, but in reality the alliance had no substance. According to Kissinger, "The USSR cemented its domination over Eastern Europe", and yet "this alliance was devoid of substance co-ordinated by the coercion, while the Kremlin did its utmost to interrupt the process of Western unification" (Kissinger, 2007: p. 394).

At the beginning of the Cold War, the superiority granted by the fact that it was the only country with the secret of the atomic bomb, gave Americans the chance to dictate world politics. Therefore, they did not take a clear initiative in reforming their foreign policy, the American tradition demanding that each foreign initiative be justified by national security reasons. With the loss of the atomic monopoly, this policy demanded reform, and the United States could not continue its isolationist policy. It was clear that the new atomic power, the USSR, would use this advantage over the European states to facilitate the spread of the communist regime.

The United States has sought to discourage a strategic nuclear attack on Western Europe by deploying its strategic nuclear umbrella to cover its NATO allies (Layne, 2011: p. 221) by elaborating the doctrine of massive retaliation, according to which the US would respond to any attack on its own territory or its allies with a nuclear attack. It was a bold move from the Americans, which started both from the need to defend its own territory and from the need to sustain the image America had succeeded in creating, the world power that served as an example to other countries. However, there are many opinions that see this "widespread discouragement" as not being comprehensible given that "one of the permanent problems of deterrence for the benefit of a third party is that the price that a state is willing to pay is usually much lower unless its territory is threatened, and it is very difficult to claim that things are different " (Layne, 2011: p. 221-222). In other words, the interest shown by the Americans, as the declarant protector of Western states, was not considered to be quite as intense as declared. In a nuclear era, this strategic deterrence is even more difficult to believe, as the hired defender risks its own territory in defending his allies. Still, all nuclear weapons amplify the imperative of self-help that is at the heart of international politics, and although it may be considered a political recklessness to the widespread discouragement and commitment of the Americans, it can only work if both potential strategic and defense allies are convinced that their commitment is credible.

The Theory of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) marked a deliberate departure from rationality in the strategic theory, defining the threat of suicide. In practice, it provided a great advantage, certainly a psychological one, to the party capable of launching challenges that the opponent could only respond to in other ways than using a general nuclear war (Kissinger, 2007: p. 680).

The stake of the Americans was on the European unit, namely the Western Europe, for counterbalancing the Soviet power and keeping them in chess. Kissinger believes that "many years of insecurity cannot be our goal, at any stage, all allies must continue to share

the same feeling that NATO's security is indivisible. Otherwise, the Alliance's two pillars may start to ruin. It was a new and long-term, demoralizing idea that the cost of maintaining the alliance should condemn the civilian population of each ally to total vulnerability" (Kissinger, 2007). The presence of the Americans on the European continent was advantageous to them because it allowed them to "contain" the communists from a strategic position, and ensure the security of their own continent at the same time. Washington has relied on a multilateralism policy for peacekeeping, while the USSR has created a line of East European Communist states by creating the Mutual Economic Aid Council.

In the 1960s, the US gave up the doctrine of massive retaliation following President Kennedy's election, and made efforts to intensify diplomatic relations in order to solve the nuclear problems. Thus, international developments have taken a new form, from discouraging, the constant threat of nuclear weapons, to the seeking to solve international problems. In this way, the first non-proliferation treaty SALT I meant to limit strategic weapons emerged in 1968, a treaty that illustrated the new diplomatic relations between the two nuclear powers.

the Soviets never accepted the complicated Western terror of nuclear deterrence, although they were consistent with their basis. In the early 1970s, under Brezhnev-Kosāghin-Podgornāi, the Soviet strategic doctrine was now inspired by the principle of "prudent flexibility". Its fundamental statements resembled the American ones in the sense that a nuclear war had to be firmly avoided, and the ability of the state to strategically defy, both in a defensive and offensive manner, is the best guarantee for this goal. At the same time, the Soviet doctrine provided for the preparation to win an unwanted nuclear war.

To sum up, although a nuclear war was not desirable, both states were increasing their arsenal in order to discourage their opponent, but also to be prepared to respond. During this period, America pursued a pacifist policy, meaning that it provided security guarantees to European states that felt threatened by the USSR's nuclear ascent in order to prevent the start of an arms race. Although the promises of the Americans were doubtful in the eyes of the Soviets, they never tried the veracity of these statements, so we can say that the American strategy was fruitful.

Following what has been said before, we can conclude that it was difficult for the Americans to demonstrate the truthfulness of their commitment, as they still needed to secure the Westerners and discourage the Soviets at the same time. The diplomatic relations between America and the NATO member states have been somewhat controversial, and even the solidarity of international organization has been disputed. The views were divided but a response was never completed because the American commitment was never put to trial by the USSR. Even Secretary of State Christian Herter confessed, "I cannot imagine the President of the United States involving us in a total nuclear war unless the facts clearly show that we ourselves are threatened with destruction or that effective measures have been taken to destroy us" (Layne, 2011: p. 123).

Although the USSR did not test the commitment of the Americans until they felt threatened, they continued pursuing their own ideals. Stalin's goal was to perpetuate the communist regime by trying to establish communist governments in its satellite states where, although it was not a Communist government, the Communist parties were dictating the policy of the respective countries. The 1970s also brought about a change in the USSR doctrine, a change brought by Mihail Gorbachev, who reoriented the foreign policy of the Soviet Union by concluding Brezhnev's doctrines and replacing it with the

Sinatra doctrine which allowed the Warsaw Pact member states to choose their own way in domestic politics.

The end of the Cold War was marked by the attempt to control the development of nuclear weapons. New American President Ronald Reagan changed America's way of conducting international affairs. Reagan implied a defining duality, represented by his dream of creating a world free of nuclear weapons, but which was extremely serious about the development of weapons to protect his territory and allies. Soviet leaders were not impressed by the morality that Reagan had shown, but were forced to take into account America's technological potential. The SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) policy has helped open the way for arms control, resulting in the Soviets getting engaged in the arms control talks they had interrupted (Kissinger, 2007: p. 680).

The most prominent moment that demonstrated the leaders' willingness to take an attitude in this regard was the 1986 peak meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik, where Kissinger reported that the two leaders agreed to reduce all strategic forces by 50% within five years, and to destroy all ballistic missiles on the parcel of ten years. At one point, Reagan came to accept the Soviet bid to dismantle all nuclear weapons. In this way, Reykjavik brought very close cooperation between the US and the USSR, which so many Allies and Neutrals had feared alike. If the other nuclear powers refused to accept the Soviet-American agreement, they would suffer public abuse, pressure from the two superpowers or isolation. Still, the deal failed on the one hand because the new nuclear powers were not prepared to give up their own nuclear intimidation force, and on the other hand because of Gorbachev's pressures to get more, ending up resisting Reagan.

By the end of the Cold War, the USSR had lost the ability to create problems, and the main point on Reagan's agenda was the arms' control negotiations. The Cold War did not continue, mainly due to the pressure the Reagan administration had exerted on the Soviet system. "What has stopped the outbreak of the war [...] was the irrationalisation of pure terror on both sides. That was what Churchill predicted when he saw the hope in the "equality of annihilation". This was what Eisenhower had understood when he was ruling out the possibility of carrying out limited nuclear wars: his strategy leaves no choice but to ensure complete destruction, based on the presumption that it, instead of imposing the confidence to orchestrate the levels of destruction in the midst of a war, it would prevent its outbreak from the beginning " (Gaddis, 2009: p. 158).

References

- Allison, G., Zelikow, P. (2010) *Esența Deciziei O explicație a crizei rachetelor din Cuba*, Iași: Polirom.
- Anderson, D. (2001) "Paradigm Lost", *Diplomatic History*, vol 25., no. 4.
- Brodie, B. (1959) *Strategy in the Missile Age*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, [online] Available: file:///D:/Downloads/RAND_CB137-1.pdf.
- Gaddis, J. L. (2009) *Razboiul Rece*, Bucuresti: Rao.
- Kennedy, P. (2011). *Ascensiunea si decaderea marilor puteri*, Iasi: Polirom.
- Kissinger, H. (2007). *Diplomatia*, Bucuresti: ALL.
- Layne, C. (2011). *Pacea iluziilor*, Iasi: Polirom, 2011.
- McKeown, T. (2001). "The Journal of Politics", *Plans and Routines, Bureautic Bargaining and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, vol.63, 2001, pp.1171- 1175.

Mearsheimer, J. (2001). *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, U.S.: W.W. Norton & Company.

Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). *Politics Among Nations*, New York: A. A. Knopf.

Nye, J. S. (2005). *Desifrarea Conflictelor Internationale: teorie si conflict*, Prahova: ANTET XX PRESS.

Posen, B. (1986). *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*, Cornell University Press.

Serban, I. (2013). "Theories and Concepts in International Relations – from Idealism to Realism", *Revista de Științe Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques*, No. 40, 52-58.

Taliaferro, J. W. (2000) "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited", *Quarterly Journal: International Security*, vol. 25. no. 3.

Tellis, A. J. (1984). *The drive to Domination: Towards a Pure Realist Theory of Politics*", PhD thesis, Political Science Department, University of Chicago.

Waltz, K. (2006) *Teoria politicii internationale*, Iasi: Polirom.

Analysis of the relationship between sociology of religion and social movement

Adesoji Oni^a

^aDepartment of Educational Foundations, University of Lagos, Akoka -Yaba, Lagos, Nigeria

Abstract

The study of social movements and the sociology of religion share common similarities and they can benefit from each other. Theorizing for both fields is somehow similar. This paper is an attempt to briefly present the supply-side and resource mobilization theories in the studies of the sociology of religion and the literature of social movements. The paper is a sort of comparative analysis for the sociology of religion and the literature of social movements. It presents a brief literature review of the supply-side theory, and some examples of studies that have used this model; brief presentation of the resource mobilization theory; and finally an assessment of the recruitment tactics and commitment levels in both fields of sociology.

Keywords: *Sociology of religion; social movement; supply-side theory; resource mobilization.*

1. Introduction

The study of social movements and the sociology of religion share common similarities and they can benefit from each other. Theorizing for both fields is somehow similar. This paper is an attempt to briefly present the supply-side and resource mobilization theories in the studies of the sociology of religion and the literature of social movements. Since the seventies, the resource mobilization theory has been dominating the field of social movements, but not any more. In the last decade, the supply-side theory gained a lot of support for its hypotheses from studies that have been conducted on religious studies in the United States and Europe. However, this model also received some critique from various scholars in many studies. Nonetheless, one is of the view that at the present time, this model is very convincing in its assumptions and hypotheses. This paper will be some sort of comparative analysis for the sociology of religion and the literature of social movements. We shall present a brief literature review of the supply-side theory, and some examples of studies that have used this model; brief presentation of the resource mobilization theory; and finally an assessment of the recruitment tactics and commitment levels in both fields of sociology.

· Adesoji Oni. E-mail address: aoluoni@yahoo.com.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1. The Macro Level

The supply-side theory suggests that religious participation inclines when there is available religious supply and that religious competition increases religious participation. It also suggests that religious monopoly and state support decreases the level of religious participation (Froese 2001, Stark and Iannaccone, 1994). The state plays an important role in controlling the level of religious competition. The state might leave the religious market free of regulations or very minor ones (the United States, for example), or regulate and restrict religious practices (former USSR and East Europe in the past), or support one or two religious firms and restrict other unwanted religious groups, (Latin America, Gill 1998).

Finke and Iannaccone (1993) described religion as an object of choice and production. In their economic model, they view churches and religious administrators as producers who design their products and design how to market them. While consumers, on the other hand, choose from the religious market what they want to adapt and to what extent they want to participate in it. In a free religious market, religious producers compete to produce goods that can attract consumers and keep up with the market. They also noted the importance of the government role in regulating or deregulating this type of market (Finke and Iannaccone 1993, Chaves and Cann 1992). In the religious market, religious firms compete to produce attractive commodities, and consumers choose what religion (if any) they will participate in and how much involvement they will have in it (Iannaccone, 1991).

It is argued that in the absence of state regulations on religion, religious competition will increase, which will lead to high level of religious participation. Froese tested this assumption in his study on Hungary, 2001. He agrees that as a communist country, Hungary witnessed a relatively low level of religious participation. Little before the mid 1990s, anti religion campaigns started and church lands were nationalized. Later, the state started regulating religion and nationalizing church schools to prevent the church's influence on the young generation and alienate them from religion. Secularization doctrine at the same time gained a lot of support and followers, and the state declared itself as an atheist country in 1949. Religious participation and church attendance were dropping during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. This drop can be explained by state regulations on religion and the methods of coercion that were used to enforce these regulations. All churches had to sign an agreement with the state that regulates and limits their activities. Church officials and religious leaders had suffered many forms of harassment and pure coercion (2001).

Froese used data from the World Values Survey that was collected in 1981, in which the country was under the communist regime, and in 1990, in which the country has new laws that grant religious freedom. The data showed strong support to the supply-side hypothesis. In 1981, the percentage of Hungarian population that indicated that they pray was 45%, while in 1990, the percentage was 57%. This indicates an increase in the level of religious participation.

Even though Eastern Europe has provided a strong support for the supply-side theory after communism, there were some exceptions that did not appear to support the economic model. The exceptions are best described by the cases of Poland and East Germany. The economic model may appear to be unable to explain these cases. Research

indicates that the level religious participation had decreased after the collapse of communism and even after the emergence of laws that allowed free religious market. According to the economic model, the decrease of government regulations on religion will increase the level of religious participation. Churches regained their institutional freedom and the public is allowed to participate in religion.

Furthermore, a free religious market that will allow free religious competition will increase religious consumption. However, this was not the case in Poland and East Germany. The level of religious participation had decreased even though religious pluralism was there. Nonetheless, a study on these two countries done by Froese and Pfaff (2001) used to further advance the economic model and provide an explanation for these two cases. In their study, they use claims and explanations of sociologists of religion that help serving and advancing the economic model. It is argued that in specific situations, such as conflict instead of competition, may produce high-level religiosity (Stark and Finke, 2000). It is also claimed that some groups use their religious communities as “free social spaces” like marginalized groups, social and political movements (Sherkat and Ellison, 1999). Religious communities may become a source of support to marginalized groups and provide support to social movements. For example, the role of black churches in civil right movement, religious institutions in the Middle East. Churches also have a role of presenting the nation’s identity “national church”, this role become possible to occur when there is a monopoly of one religion. In this case this church would be able to carry the identity of the nation (Bruce, 1999). This type of churches will have committed members during communism, because they will be a symbol of nationalism and opposition to communism. As a result, the collapse of communism will lead to low rate of membership and commitment. Therefore, the reduction of religious participation in this situation should not contradict with the general assumptions of the economic model (Froese and Pfaff, 2001).

Iannaccone indicates that the level of religious belief and participation tend to be low what he religious market is monopolized, and tend to be high when the religious market is competitive (1991). In the case of Poland, the Catholic Church during communism was privileged with the monopoly over the religious market, which according to the economic model should gain low rate of participation and little commitment of its members, but this was not the case. Having the monopoly, the Catholic Church became the national church that gave the Poles their cultural identity. It was a symbol of a strong nation that resists the atheistic communist government. As a result, the collapse of communism will vanish the need for this type of church because there are no conflicts anymore.

The situation in East Germany was a little different than that of Poland. Before the collapse of communism, the church used to have some sort of autonomy and served as an alternative for the state controlled institutions. After the collapse, the church lost that position, individual who participated in the religious activities for political reasons and to oppose communism do not need to get involved with church anymore. The new political system provided freedom for the individuals to pursue their personal interests. The merge of the Lutheran Church in East Germany with the Evangelical Church Association after the union of the republic might be another reason for the religiosity decline in East Germany. This merge brought the German federal law of the church taxes for member of religious organizations. Furthermore, the church’s involvement in East Germany before the collapse

of communism appeared to be a positive involvement to the public, but after the unification, the church appeared to be involved in political wrongdoing.

One of the assumptions of the supply-side theory is that religious participation will be high when religion is less regulated by the state. Chaves et al (1994) provided support to the supply-side theory by testing this hypothesis on minority groups. They argued that this hypothesis applies on the Muslim minorities in the Christian dominated societies. They included 18 countries that have Muslim minorities in their study. They used the rate in which Muslims do the “hajj” to Mecca as an indicator of religious participation. They found a negative relationship between the state regulation and the religious participation. Once the socioeconomic status is controlled, religious participation (practicing the hajj) tend to be higher in the less regulated countries.

2.2. Mezzo Level

Iannaccone argues that strict churches are stronger than weak churches, he states, “strictness makes organizations stronger and more attractive” (1994: p. 1180). He argues that Protestantism since 1950s started losing members, and the trend was that liberal denominations have the highest decline rate comparing to conservative denominations, while the most conservative denominations were growing. Iannaccone notes that religion is a social phenomenon that, in practice, has to be experienced in groups, “religion is a commodity that people produce collectively” (1994: p. 1183).

Religious organizations are always faced with the problem of free riding. This problem emerges when members of an organization receive benefits from the organization because of their collective work. Each member receives these benefits regardless of his/her own efforts. Some members, rationally and following their own interest or even sometimes unintentionally, try to reduce the effort and “free-ride off those of others”. Strict churches indirectly reduce the problem of free riding by penalizing and prohibiting members from participating in other activities that may use the members’ resources. Penalties and prohibitions push the less committed members out of the organization. There are some activities that are easily monitored, but there are some activities that are hard to monitor such as drinking, smoking, sex and eating. Iannaccone agrees that these activities are hard to monitor, but still, the deception cost will be high. It would be easy to hide yourself when you drink alcohol, and it is not the same when you drink in parties or bars.

Iannaccone measures church strictness by developing an order for the strictness or distinctiveness of various religions, and compares it to church attendance. The results show consistency with the suggested hypothesis. He also tested the Protestant denominational differences. He used a scale of level of strictness (liberal, moderate, and conservative) and compared the differences between these three denominations regarding income, education, attendance, church contributions, membership in church affiliated groups, and secular membership. From the data, for “every variable the pattern of variation is monotonic, increasing (or decreasing) steadily as one moves from liberal to moderate to conservative” (1994: p. 1194). For income, education and secular membership, the variables tend to decrease when we move from liberal to conservative, while for attendance and membership in church affiliated groups, the variables tend to increase when we move in the same direction. Therefore, the stricter the organization is, its members tend to be poorer and less educated, they also tend to contribute more to the church and attend services more than those of less strict churches. While people who are liberal and religiously moderate have more tendencies to participate in secular activities and participate in organizations

outside the church. Iannaccone believes that “a high-cost group maintains its strict norms of conduct precisely because they limit participation in competing activities and thereby raise levels of participation within the group” (1994: p. 1197).

Semi-Involuntary Participation

In their study on church participation among black Americans, Ellison and Sherkat (1995) investigated “the regional variations in African American religious life” (1995: p. 1415). They compared black communities of the south to communities of urban non-south regarding three issues:

1. social role of religious institutions;
2. availability of alternative lifestyles and secular opportunities for status and resources;
3. social norms and community expectations regarding church involvement (1995: 1415).

They suggested that: 1) church participation will be the highest among the rural southern communities; 2) because of the semi-involuntary thesis; the southerners will be more likely to participate intermittently and less likely to abandon the church than non-southerners. According to the semi-voluntary thesis, the norms of church participation and the social sanctions on individuals who do not participate will be highest among the rural south. They also hypothesized that “the magnitude of the relationships between perceived rewards of congregational involvement and reported patterns of church participation will be weakest among rural southerners and strongest among non-southerners” (1995: p. 1419).

To test these hypotheses, they used data from the National Survey of Black Americans (NSBA), and household probability samples gathered by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The results were consistent with the hypotheses. Church participation is highest among rural-south communities, and rural southerners are more likely to engage in religious activities. Blacks from urban and suburban non-south who do not receive benefits from their congregational involvement search for happiness in secular venues without having the problem of social sanctions.

2.3. Individual Level

In many cases, religious consumers are underestimated and viewed as passive recipients of religion (Iannaccone, 1990). Church members do not rely completely on the clergy, but they also use their skills and experiences to find religious satisfaction. Iannaccone uses the economic model of household production and human capital to test a model of religious participation. The personal skills and experience contain religious knowledge, some type of knowledge of the church doctrine and rituals, and social relations with other worshippers, which Iannaccone calls them religious human capital. This human capital is important to enable the individual to produce and appreciate religious commodities, without this “religious investment” it is hard (or even impossible) to appreciate religious services, because you have to have the means to understand and become familiar with these services. Thus, religious mobility “becomes progressively less likely as people age” (1990: p. 313).

3. Social Movements

Supply-side theory has a significant dominance over the sociology of religion it did and still develops the field of sociology in explaining religious participation among other things. It is documented in that literature that most religious affiliations and groups tend to be more active in recruiting people when there is competition in the religious market and when there is no monopoly in the religious market. Consistently, social movements can become more active when there is competition in the market, too. In the literature of protest movements, Olzak and Uhrig (2001) argued, “competition and legitimating processes affected the rates of protest activities” (p. 695). In the sociology of religious literature it is argued from the supply-side theory’s point of view that legitimacy of a religious group is expected to increase the popularity of that group, unless it has a monopoly over the market. But when this group is illegitimate and banded by the state, it usually faces a lot of troubles and obstacles to survive. Social movements are similar to religious groups in that sense, “legitimizing of a practice or an organizational form increases its frequency or popularity by increasing rates of initiation and decreasing rates of abandonment” (2001: p. 695).

Social movements like religious movements, compete for limited resources. They compete for a niche that has a limited capacity, and the survival is for the fittest. The success of one movement depletes the resources for other movements. Therefore, movements try to innovate different tactics and methods for their political behaviour. In a competitive market, innovations are encouraged. As a result, when movement tactics produce successful results, these tactics become imitated and used by other movements. Olzak and Uhrig stated “replicated activated may become institutionalized as routine political behaviour” (2001: p. 695). Imitations of tactics and activities in the organizations literature are called isomorphism (I do not have my articles and notes from the complex organizations’ class), which is the adoption of the methods and tactics of other successful organizations.

4. Resource Mobilization Theory

Resource mobilization theory is one of the essential theories in social movements. This theory in general deals with the dynamics and tactics of social movements when they grow, decline, and change. It also examines all kinds of resources that need to be mobilized, the relationships between social movement and other groups, the need of social movement for external support for its success, and the tactics that the state uses to facilitate or oppress a social movement (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). This perspective considers the study of the aggregation of resources (money and labour) crucial for understanding social movement. Resource aggregation requires some sort of organization. Furthermore, the participation of individuals or groups from outside the collectivity is very crucial for the success or failure of a movement.

There are some assumptions for the resource mobilization perspective. First, social movements do not have to be based on grievance, and constituents are the ones who provide the movement with the major support of resources. It’s also not always that those supporters have commitment to the value and beliefs of the movement. Second, they see that social movements have all kinds of strategic tasks in dealing with authorities. These tasks vary from tactics to mobilize resources, neutralize opponents and make them by standards, and transforming the masses into sympathizers. Third, they believe that society is the entity that provides all the means that a social movement may need. And it provides

the infrastructure in which social movements utilize, such as media, levels of affluence, access to institutional centers, networks (1977: p. 1217).

Some organizations depend heavily on volunteer labour (religious organizations, for example), while others purchase labour. They see the SMOs goals as products and the adherents as demand. They agree that the higher the education of individuals, the more likely that they would give time, and people who give more time to volunteer are expected to give more money (1977: p. 1224).

5. Recruitment

Social movements can use a variety of tactics for mobilization; these could be on macro, mezzo, or micro level of mobilization. Macro mobilization may occur when an SMO advertises itself nationwide and to target all sects of society via TV networks, or organizational networks. Mezzo level mobilization is the mobilization of subgroups, minorities, specific sects of society or members of other SMOs within the same SMI. Micro mobilization is a mobilization on the individual level that targets individuals through personal networks, or personal interaction (Snow *et al*, 1986).

Religious groups and religious movements use very similar tactics for mobilization and recruitment. They try to mobilize supporters on many different levels. They target the general public, racial, or ethnic groups, and individual. Furthermore, it seems that social movements are more successful in utilizing social networks in their processes of recruitment than religious groups. Scholars of the sociology of religion admit that there is a “present weakness of the empirical basis for the network component of recruitment theories” (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980: p. 1377). Stark and Bainbridge (1980) tried to provide some empirical support for the argument that interpersonal relations are at the center of the recruitment process. In their paper, they traced the development of two lines of the recruitment process; the old one that focuses on the ideology of religious cults and sects, and the needs of its potential recruits, and the more advanced one which focuses on the interpersonal relation as an essential element for recruitment. Their study focused on cults and sects, and it suggested that cults and sects are similar to deviant movements that tend to recruit people that have grievance and suffer from depravation. Also, to understand whom a set or a cult may recruit, it is important to see who the beneficiaries from its ideologies are.

In some earlier studies, Lofland and Stark (1965) studied the Moonies, and they concluded those interpersonal bonds between cult members and potential adherents are essential to recruitment. They argued that when these bonds existed, people joined, and when those bonds did not exist, recruitment failed and people did not join. The acceptance for the ideology usually came later after people have already joined. In the case of the Mormons, bonds between church members and non-Mormons are the center of the recruitment to the Mormon Church. Interpersonal ties and bonds are important for recruiting new adherents for cults and sects because people who join need to have trust and confidence relations with members because most of these groups radical or extreme and different from the main line stream. More studies provided support for the important role that interpersonal relations play in recruitment in cults and sects (Hardyck and Barden 1962, Nordquist 1978 cited in Stark and Bainbridge 1980). All these studies provided strong support for this thesis; nonetheless, this thesis has lesser empirical support in conventional faiths.

6. Commitment

There are some differences between social movements and religious groups and organizations regarding commitment. It seems to me that members of most social movements lack strong commitment to their ideas and beliefs, or at least lack the same level of commitment religious groups' members has. This paper tries to provide explanations for this trend in the following paragraphs. One of the reasons for this trend is strictness, as indicated in the above. Most religious affiliations and religious groups that are known as strict have high level of commitment. It is argued that liberal denominations decline more rapidly than conservative ones, not only that but, conservative denominations grow (Iannaccone, 1994; Finke 1997; Iannaccone, Olson and Stark, 1995). In his paper, *Why Strict Churches are Strong*. Iannaccone (1994) argued that people who join strict churches and remain members in them are the ones who have strong beliefs and commitment. As a result, those people are willing to conduct a lot of activities (volunteer, donate, and participate in religious activities) that they would not do if they were not highly committed to their churches. Free riding is a problem that exists in almost all social and religious movements. Raising the cost of participation decreases the free-riding problem. Strict churches have high cost demands and prohibitions such as the prohibition of joining secular activities; therefore, members who remain in these churches are the ones who are willing to meet these demands. Consequently, members of strict churches are people who have high commitment. Most social movements, however, do not have this kind of strictness and as a result they usually have lower rate of commitment than religious groups. Religious groups, unlike most social movement, limit and restrict non-group activities to increase the production of collective goods and commitment (Finke, 1997). You cannot be a Muslim and participate in religious Hindu activities, but you can be a peace activist and a women's rights activist too.

The supply-side theory provides us with the argument that if a religious denomination has a monopoly over the market, religious participation and commitment will be low, and vice versa. In a study done on Catholics, Stark and McCann (1993) showed that "ordination rates, the ratio of priests to nominal Catholics, and catholic school enrolments are proportionality highest where Catholics are few" (1993: p. 111). Competition and plurality is expected to increase participation and in turn increase commitment.

Montgomery (1996) argued, "Individuals with higher incomes prefer less strict denominations" (1996: 1, electronic version). He claimed that there has been a misunderstanding to the dynamic nature religious economy, and he provided a model that explains this economy. There was always a decline in some religious denominations, and, at the same time, increase in some other denominations. But the mistake was that this decline was perceived as a result of secularization. According to Montgomery, the religious economy as a whole remains stable. He illustrated his argument by giving an example that a strict denomination start with members from a low class, and over time most of those people gain some social upward mobility. As a consequence, they may consider lowering the strictness of their denomination and secularize it. When they succeed, individuals with lower class income move out of that denomination and form a strict sect, while their first denomination becomes secularized. This is an example that explains the secularization of some denominations and the formation of new ones, and the religious economy over all remains stable.

Another reasons for the difference of commitment between social movements and religious groups is that most people who join conventional faiths do join because of the ideas and the ideologies of these faiths. In most cases, the ideas of a religion appeal to its potential adherents and make sense to them, and then they join. Recruitment in social movements, on the other hand, depends heavily on social networks and personal ties. Ideology and ideas receive more attention from conventional religious groups than social movements.

7. Framing Perspective

Social movements started to have more focus on ideas and beliefs since the development of frame analysis perspective by Snow *et al* (1986). Scholars of the framing perspective argue that the actors who actively engage in their productions develop ideas and meanings. Benford and Snow (2000) argued that social movements should not be viewed as carriers of ideas that have been developed from structural arrangements and existing ideologies, but rather “movement actors are viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers” (2000: p. 613). They see framing as an active processual construction of meanings. It is active because there is action that is being done and processual because it is evolving and changing, not static. Resonance of the framing processes is central to this perspective. Bedford (1993) stated that frame resonance is “how reality should be presented” instead of “what reality ought to be real” (1993: p. 679). The concept of resonance is related to the effectiveness of proffered framings, and it shows if some framings are effective or not (Benford and Snow, 2000).

8. Donations

Social movements and religious groups and organizations tend to have similar trends toward donations and contributions. It is argued that in sociology of religion, people who are strongly committed to God will give more money to the church (Hoge and Yang, 1994). Iannaccone (1997) argued, “the distribution of the amount of money that is being contributed to any church is skewed” (1997: p. 141). He tried to explain this skewness in terms of three facts: 1. percentage rates of donations differ from one case to another, 2. income is also different, 3. there is a weak correlation between the income a household has and the amount of donation they given to a church. He indicated that most people contribute between zero and 4% of their income with a mean of about 2%. There is a weak relationship between income and donations (income only explains 1% of the variation, 1997).

9. Conclusion

This was a brief presentation of the supply-side and resource mobilization theories of the sociology of religion and the studies of social movements. We presented these theories briefly to see and understand the relativeness of those two fields of sociology. There are a lot of similarities in their recruitment tactics and tasks. And we thought it would be helpful and beneficial for both fields to understand and share their commonalties. These and assumptions from both sides can be applied and operationalized in either field. However, we are not saying that there are no differences and variation from each other. This paper is a humble attempt to lay out these commonalties and differences. Sociologists

of social movements or the sociology of religion might be able to benefit from these fields and learn from what have been done them.

References

- Benford, R. (1993) "Frame disputes within the nuclear disarmament movement", *Social Forces* 71(3), 677 – 701.
- Benford, R., Snow D. (2000) "Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment", *Annual Reviews* 26, 611 – 639.
- Bruce, S. (1999) *Choice and religion: A critique of rational choice theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chaves, M., Cann, D. E. (1992) "Regulation, pluralism and religious market structure: Explaining religion's vitality", *Rationality and Society* 4, 274 – 290.
- Chaves, M., Schraeder, P. J., Sprindys, M. (1994) "State regulation of religion and Muslim religious vitality in the industrial west", *The Journal of Politics* 56(4), 1087 – 1097.
- Ellison, C. G., Sherkat, D. (1995) "The semi-involuntary institution revisited: Regional variations in church participation among Black Americans", *Social Forces* 73(4), 1415 – 1437.
- Finke, R. (1997) "An orderly return to tradition: Explaining the recruitment of members into Catholic religious orders", *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion* 36(2), 218 (electronic version).
- Finke, R., Iannaccone, L. R. (1993) "Supply-side explanations for religious change", *The Annals of the American Academy* 527, 27 – 39.
- Froese, P. (2001) "Hungary for religion: A supply-side interpretation of the Hungarian religious revival", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 40(2), 251 – 268.
- Froese, P., Pfaff, S. (2001) "Replete and desolate markets: Poland, East Germany and the new religious paradigm", *Social Forces* 80(2), 481 – 507.
- Gill, A. (1998) *Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic church and the state in Latin America*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hoge, D. R., Yang, F. (1994) "Determinants of religious giving in American denominations: Data from two nationwide surveys", *Review of Religious Research* 36(2), 123 – 148.
- Iannaccone, L. R. (1990) "Religious practice: A human capital approach", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 29(3), 297 – 314.
- Iannaccone, L. R. (1991) "The consequences of religious market structure: Adam Smith and the economics of religion", *Rationality and Society* 3(2), 156 – 177.
- Iannaccone, L. R. (1994) "Why strict churches are strong", *American Journal of Sociology* 99(5), 1180 – 1211.
- Iannaccone, L. R. (1997) "Skewness explained: A rational choice model of religious giving", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 36(2), 141.
- Iannaccone, L. R., Olson, D., Stark, R. (1995) "Religious resources and church growth", *Social Forces* 74(2), 705 – 731.
- Lofland, J. and Stark, R. (1965) "Becoming a world-savor: A theory of conversion to a deviant perspective", *American Sociological Review* 30, 862 – 875.
- McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N. (1977) "Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory", *American Journal of Sociology* 82(6), 1212 – 1241.

Montgomery, J. D. (1996) "Dynamics of the religious economy", *Rationality and Society*, 8(1).

Olzak, S., Uhlig, N. S. C. (2001) "The ecology of tactical overlap", *American Sociological Review* 66, 694 – 717.

Sherkat, D. E., Ellison, C. G. (1999) "Recent development and current controversies in the sociology of religion", *Annual Review of Sociology*. 1999, 363 – 394.

Snow, D. A., Burke-Rochford, Jr. E., Wordn, S. K. and Benford, R. D. (1986) "Frame alignment processes, micro-mobilization, and movement participation", *American Sociological Review* 51, 464 – 481.

Stark, R., Bainbridge, W. S. (1980) "Networks of faith: Interpersonal bonds and recruitment to cults and sects", *American Journal of Sociology* 85(6), 1376 – 1395.

Stark, R., Finke, R. (2000) *Acts of faith*, California: University of California Press.

Stark, R., Iannaccone, L. R. (1994) "A study-side reinterpretation of the secularization of Europe", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 33(3), 230 – 252.

Stark, R., McCann, J. C. (1993) "Market forces and Catholic commitment: Exploring the new paradigm", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 32(2), 111 – 124.

Social cohesion policies between abstract forecasting and concrete implementation*

Salvatore Cimini^a, Federico Valentini^b

^a*Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Teramo, Italy*

^b*University of L'Aquila, Italy*

Abstract

The paper concerns the process of social cohesion, as an instrument aimed at integration and common economic development with a simultaneous reduction of the disparities between the different Member States of the European Union, as well as between the different territories of each State. Precisely the social and economic differences between the EU countries and the enormous disparities between the territories of a single State constitute an obstacle to the effective implementation of common policies.

Starting from this assumption, the purpose of the research is to identify possible interventions that, with a view to renewing the cohesion policy, could lead to greater effectiveness of the measures underlying the rebalancing of the economy, functional to the homogeneous growth of the whole European territory, in the awareness that the lack of growth even of a small area ends up, in the long run, with hindering global development.

A first step is to enhance the direct relationship between the local authorities closest to the citizens and the Institutions of the European Union in the large decision-making processes, both with reference to the upward phase of programming and the descending phase of planning. Moreover, a good policy of cohesion functional to common economic development cannot be separated from the incentive of the instruments of "participative democracy": in fact, economic growth also passes through the involvement of the population (citizens and associations) which is established and lives in the territory concerned from innovations.

Finally, a further aspect should be pointed out because it strongly undermines the process of economic growth: the managerial inability shown by the Italian public administrations in implementing the cohesion policies which, therefore, are destined to fail. Excessive bureaucracy is an obstacle to the successful outcome of the cohesion procedures and, therefore, an improvement in the national administrative organization is desirable through the implementation of resources.

Key words: *social cohesion; economic development; European Union; Member State; participative democracy; administrative organization.*

1. Origin and evolution of cohesion policies

The European Union, ever since it was the "coldest" European Community, has always been motivated by the noble intent to achieve and maintain a strong social,

· The work is the result of a common reflection. However, Prof. Salvatore Cimini is the author of paragraphs 1 and 2, and Dr. Federico Valentini wrote paragraphs 2, 4 and 5.

· Salvatore Cimini. *E-mail address:* scimini@unite.it.

economic and territorial cohesion among the States that are part of it. In fact, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was rightly founded because combining economic interests would have helped the life standards raising. It is worth recalling that all this comes as a consequence of the previous and rending story of the Second World War which had plagued the territories and divided communities.

Cohesion, from the Community legislature point of view, is a complex concept that includes multiple actions implemented to the purpose of reducing the disparities between the various Member States, as well as between the different territories that make up the individual State. This is in the awareness that the lack of economic growth, even of a single and small geographical area, compromises - in the long run - the global development. And indeed, it is precisely the common economic development that constitutes the ultimate goal of the cohesion policy.

The origins of a policy aimed at overcoming the economic imbalances between the various areas of the former European Community, can already be glimpsed in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, whose preamble reports the commitment of the signatories States to “*ensure the harmonious development, reducing the disparities between the different regions and the delay of the less favoured ones*”. Also the art. 2 establishes that one of the European Community (now EU) tasks is to promote social cohesion and solidarity among the Member States.

However, instead of the declarations of intent embodied in the Treaty, the European Economic Community (EEC) at the time, did not provide a concrete solution for achieving the result, and left the difficult task to individual Member States (few and homogeneous at that time): the territorial rebalancing policies were entirely entrusted to the national governments exclusive competence which showed what has been authoritatively defined as a «*landes - blindheit*» (Ipsen, 1966: p.248; D’Atena, 1998: p. 1401; Weatherill, 2005: p. 1)¹.

Increasing the number of States within the Community, resulting in a lack of homogeneity between them, led to a strengthening of the European integration and economic rebalancing that began with the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). This led to the Single European Act of 1986 that, paying attention to the sub-state organization levels and laying the foundations for a reform of the Structural Funds, marked the definitive overcoming of the previous phase of undifferentiated regions and the birth of a concrete structural policy for achieving the economic and social cohesion.

Decisive steps forward along this direction, have been made with the European Single Market, based on the famous four freedoms of movement (of people, goods, capital and services) and with the creation of the single monetary area by the Maastricht Treaty.

It is exactly this Treaty that marks the turning point in the integration and economic rebalancing process, as it has promptly implemented the multiple pressures aimed at giving greater weight to the sub-state institutions² political decisions. Just think of the art. 146 reform (now Article 14, paragraph 2, TEU) according to which the Regions members can

¹It literally means “regional blindness” and indicates the indifference of the European institutions towards the territorial articulations of the individual Member States.

² Among the many changes introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, it is sufficient to recall the effective entry into force of the Committee of the Regions, although its presence was already considered, in abstract, in the previous EC Treaty.

represent, within the Council, their own State rather than - as required before 1993 – limiting their presence to the mere role of the national delegate assistant.

However, it should be noted that this reform remained in the following years as a dead letter, partly because of the difficulty in representing a national interest from subjects point of view -which operate in circumscribed territories -, and partly because of the tendency, by the Member State, to guarantee the uniqueness of the position expressed in the Council (Simonato, 2016).

Following the Maastricht Treaty, the subsequent Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 introduces, about the territorial cohesion issue, an important new feature concerning the Committee of the Regions³. This advisory body is in fact an effective instrument of territorial integration and cohesion, being composed by representatives of the regional and local authorities, elected by the Council, in order to enhance the regional dimension as a decision-making centre. The aforementioned Amsterdam Treaty allows even the Parliament to consult the Committee of the Regions (not only the Council and the Commission), introduces new areas of competence - as well as additional hypotheses for compulsory consultation - and gives to it the full autonomy in adopting its internal regulation, which was previously a matter under the Council approval (D’Atena, 2007).

In 2000, cohesion policies are strengthened by the European Council with the so-called Lisbon strategy⁴ aimed at a more competitive economic policy, even if the economic crisis of the following years will not allow to reach the assumed growth rates (3% of economic growth, 70% of employment, 60% of female employment) (Manganaro, 2011: p. 1). What is important is that, from that moment onwards, the effort made by the European institutions to achieve the economic growth has always been greater and linked to social cohesion to which, over the time, territorial cohesion was added: just think of the Regulation CE/1084/2006 establishing a fund to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion through a sustainable development perspective in the transport and environment field.

Thus the Lisbon Treaty (Official Journal of the European Union, 30th March 2010) arrives, whose Title XVIII is entitled “Economic, social and territorial cohesion ”and in particular the art. 174 (ex. article 158 of the TCE) whose first paragraph, declares: *«In order to promote the harmonious development of the Union as a whole, it develops and pursues its own action for achieving the reinforcement of its economic, social and territorial cohesion»*. The aim of this just described action tends both to reduce the development gap between the different regions, and to support the most distressed areas such as the rural, mountain or cross-border ones. What is fundamentally important is that, on this aspect, this Treaty led to an equal position between the Parliament and the Council, and in fact the subsequent art. 177 (ex Article 161 of TEC) establishes an ordinary legislative procedure for co-decision between the two institutions; this replaces the previously applicable assent procedure.

Finally, the so-called Europe 2020 Strategy (elaborated in 2010 after the Lisbon Strategy) had important effects on the European Union cohesion. Its aim is to achieve a *“smart, sustainable and inclusive growth as a means of overcoming the structural*

³It was originally considered in the EC Treaty and now in the art. 305, 306, 307 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), entered into force in 1993 with the Maastricht Treaty as already noted in note 2 of this paper.

⁴Program of economic and social reforms that should have allowed the pursuit of the strategic objective that the Union set for the following decade.

deficiencies of the European economy, improving its competitiveness and productivity, and promoting the affirmation of a sustainable social market economy” (European Commission, 2010). Without going into detail about this ambitious project, whose results will be seen in a few years, it is worth pointing out how much importance is given to the single national realities as the objectives set become action parameters for each individual Member State which, however, is not bound in the *modus operandi*, thus allowing to contextualize the objectives to the specific territory situation (social, economic and territorial).

This fact is a further evidence of how all the measures implemented over the years to resolve the disparities between the Member States, as well as between the territories within them, have not been so effective. Moreover, there are many obstacles that overlap with the success of a cohesion policy, some of which are too rooted in the individual territories to be overcome in a few decades.

The aforementioned difficulties will be examined in the following paragraph.

2. Historical cohesion policies critical issues

The union of the peoples was a difficult goal to achieve and Robert Schuman was aware of it. In his historic declaration of May 9, 1950, he affirmed: *«Europe cannot be made once, nor it will be built together; it will arise from concrete achievements that create, first of all, a de facto solidarity»* (www.europa.eu).

As noted above, the States that gave rise to the European project (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) were few and homogeneous. It is true that the slow but steady process of enlargement of the European Union - which today has 28 Member States - can be considered as a sign of the success of the European institutions that seem to appeal an attraction on an ever increasing number of countries (D’Orsogna, 2011); but it is also true that the same process has emphasized the economic inhomogeneity between the States and, therefore, the great differences between the different areas of Europe.

The 2008 economic crisis then greatly widened the differences between the public debts of the various States so that each of them had to undertake different and more or less drastic manoeuvres. The differences between States, whose interests have been displayed to be, at times, even conflicting, have become increasingly evident. And indeed, against countries that, despite the crisis, have recorded a good economic growth (Germany, Austria) there have been many others that - precisely because of the crisis - have undergone a sharp increase in public debt and dangerous delays in the competitiveness factors (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Greece that, considered unable to cope with the difficulty, have been defined, in a disparaging way, with the comprehensive acronym “PIIGS”).

In short, the crisis has made the integration process even more demanding, which might have politically and economically cemented the Member States, in order to create a single European area that could be competitive with the great established powers (USA and Japan) and with those emerging countries (China and Russia).

Ultimately, if our aim is a single and strong territory, that of the European Union, the differences between States cannot be tolerated because there can be no growth without cohesion: this is not the place to discuss possible manoeuvres, but without doubt it is desirable that, on the one hand, the *governance* mechanisms of the European institutions should be improved –because in the past they have failed many times in reaching the

desirable results⁵ - and, on the other hand, the attitude of some States should change because, claiming excessive autonomy space, do not appear collaborative and inclined to respect the supranational constraints⁶.

Moreover macroscopic economic differences should be considered, even within the single States in which the territories growth is smaller and less homogeneous, despite the efforts made by the central governments which tried to achieve an economic rebalancing through the introduction of administrative simplification tools and economic incentive in less developed areas.

In Italy, cohesion policies have often found an obstacle in the assigned public administrations inability to implement them, with the consequent failure of the ambitious community projects: in this sense, the aspect related to the administrative organization becomes fundamentally important and, in particular, the public action efficiency, since excessive bureaucracy limits the enterprise and, therefore, the economic growth (Manganaro, 2011: p. 8).

In our country, the situation is quite alarming, occupying - in the ranking of countries where it is easier to start a business drawn up by the World Bank - a very low dignity position. Inefficiencies, often resulting from organizational *deficits*, lead to a growth delay and to an increasing gap between the north and south of the territory.

Just think of the major transport infrastructure works (topic discussed also in the following paragraph) in which the design phase is very long – as it was noted –and goes from 380 days in Lombardy to over 1,000 in Sicily; as if this were not enough, once the project is approved, a further period for the publication of the announcement is needed, between 93 days for Lombardy and 272 days for Sicily. In summary, the data show that in Italy, only to evaluate the opportunity to realize or not a public work, it takes on average 900 days, that is an excessively long period of time but at the same time is very flexible, depending on the reference regions: from 583 days in Lombardy up to 1.582 in Sicily (Rapporto Svimez 2009 sull'economia del Mezzogiorno; Manganaro, 2011: p. 9).

It is inevitable that the aforementioned imbalance generates different outcomes on cohesion policies in more or less virtuous regions and this circumstance compromises, in the long run, the global economic development.

A final, but not the least, difficulty which interfere with the successful outcome of the cohesion policies concerns the problems related to the regulation of the structural funds (Marra, 2015; Vinci, 2013). Dutifully given that these funds are the main instrument for the realization of economic, social and territorial cohesion, it is widely believed that the relative management generates a huge waste of money because the Community procedures, aimed at their allocation, evaluation and reporting, are complicated and unclear. In addition, in respect of this discipline, the evasion and fraud reported to the European Court of Auditors are increasingly frequent, even by the Organized Crime whose aims is to exploit the weaknesses of the Community legislation (Bassi, 2011: p.110).

⁵Just think of all the manoeuvres implemented before the introduction of the fiscal break-even rule by the *Fiscal Compact* to counter the economic crisis of 2008: in particular, it refers to the strengthening of the *Patto di Stabilità e Crescita*, at the *European Semester* introduced by the ECOFIN Council in 2010, to the *Europlus Pact* of 1th March 2011, as well as to the *Six Pack* and the consequent *Two Pack*.

⁶One example is the current controversy between Italy and the European institutions on the 2018 Budget Law approval.

An important fact on which it is worth reflecting, is that what has been aforementioned generates a growing sense of distrust towards an adequate and correct implementation of the cohesion policies by private operators, who increasingly renounce to submit applications for allocation of the funds. In this sense, future financial manoeuvres will have to be oriented towards strengthening the relationship between public bodies (Institutions) and private bodies (economic operators): the former are called to ensure greater transparency and simplification, the latter to have a proactive role in identifying and actualizing the social cohesion manoeuvres. Therefore this synergy seems to be essential for the correct identification and for the successful outcome of the cohesion policies.

3. Strengthening the link between European institutions and internal bodies

There can be no territorial, economic, social cohesion unless an institutional cohesion is achieved before: too often there is a rupture between the Community bodies and the sub-state bodies of the various EU countries.

In this regard, the transport sector is very significant considering the historic moment in which the macro-regions and the TEN-T Networks (*Trans-European-Transport-Network*)⁷ have been established. Even in the past, in the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion (COM 2008/616) it was reported that, in order to achieve the goal of bridging the gaps through a link of the territories that passes mainly through the creation of intermodal transport networks, it is necessary to overcome the institutional fragmentation.

This fragmentation appears to be very marked in the identifying and constructing process of the major transport infrastructure works of European interest (airports, railways, highways) in which the sub-state bodies, and in particular the Regions, are overridden by the Member States and the Community institutions, sole actors involved in the various procedure phases. In fact, the States carry out an internal investigation aimed at finding all the information necessary to formulate the proposal to be submitted to the European Commission, with details of the critical issues and possible actions to be taken in order to eliminate them; the Commission, having received the proposal, will be able to carry out in-depth or specific studies, relying on the opinion of the High Level Group⁸, non-binding however, on the priority related to the projects execution. Finally, Parliament and Council, in co-decision, evaluate the proposal received from the Commission and take a decision on it. Moreover, if the work presents specific difficulties in its execution, the European coordinators (Casanova, Brignardello, 2011: p. 63; Magnani, 2006: p. 638) intervene, figure introduced with the Decision n. 844/2004 and appointed by the Commission and the

⁷On this point, see the Regulation 1315/2013/UE that, in the first part of the art. 4, states that «*the trans-European transport network strengthens the social, economic and territorial cohesion of the Union and contributes to the creation of a single, efficient and sustainable European transport space, increases user benefits and supports inclusive growth*». The same regulation provides for a two-layer structure of the trans-European networks: the Global Network (TEN-T *Comprehensive Network*) which performs a territorial cohesion function within the individual Member States and the Central Network (TEN-T *Core Network*) which has the function of connecting the 28 countries that are part of the Union, as well as these with the neighbouring countries.

⁸They are experts who can be appointed by the European Commission. With reference to the TEN-T Networks, the related projects were examined by the High Level Group chaired by Karel Van Miert and classified according to their potential in order to ensure territorial cohesion and respect for the environment.

Parliament, after having consulted the Member States. Without forgetting the intervention of the Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency (Magnani, 2006: p. 642) which monitors the execution of the works and their funding.

On closer inspection, therefore, this procedure does not seem to give voice to the Regions and the other sub-state government levels. After all, even if the State-Regions Conference is called - undoubtedly a valid instrument of institutional cooperation - local interests could always be overcome and absorbed by the national ones and, in any case, even if it were not, they are always indirectly represented within the Commission.

In the Italian experience, the debasement of the regional powers in *subject amateria* did not fail even against a constitutional dictate that, about the major transport network, provides for—as a consequence of the reform of Title V of the Italian Constitution – an opposing State-Regions legislative competency. This structure should guarantee to the Regions a greater weight in the decision making around the descending and ascending phases of the Community law formation and implementation. It is true that we achieved the drafting of the regional Statutes which emphasize the close collaboration between the Regions and the European Union, but it is also true that in the decision-making processes, in practice, the State always plays the lion's share (leading role), going beyond the legislative principles and criteria in the name of a national interest, thus giving rise to continuous jurisdictional conflicts.

An example of this, in the copious constitutional jurisprudence context on this issue, is the historical judgement 303/2003 by which the Court - called to rule on the constitutional legitimacy judgments, promoted by various regions about some provisions of the law 443/2001 about infrastructures and strategic productive settlements - rejected the Regions censorships claiming a violation of the legislative and administrative autonomy in terms of public works. Specifically, the Court justified the regional depowering by emphasizing the link between art. 117 and art. 118 first clause. The latter provision provides that the administrative functions can be exercised by entities distant from the citizens in order to ensure their unitary exercise according to the subsidiarity, differentiation and adequacy principles; hence it reduces the rigidity of the previous article on the legislative competences.

Ultimately, the Council justifies a unifying State activity even in those matters that, *per tabulas*, area ascribed to the concurrent legislation whenever this is required by a need for unity, in the name of the national interest (De Rose, 2003: p. 2455; Caranta, 2004: p. 1058; Fico, 2015).

All this shows that, in the past years, the Regions have been depleted because of the State interference. However, it should be noted that the same Regions, debased at national level, regained a moderate authority in the European Union thanks to a cohesion policy, implemented by the Union, that enhances the direct relationship between the Regions and the Community institutions: just think of the strengthening of the aforementioned Committee of the Regions (see par 1), a body through which, today, the sub-state authorities can make their voices heard in all the major decision-making processes, not only in those relating to the transport area.

What we ultimately intend to underline is that, under the new super national ideas, a certain progress towards an economic and social cohesion has certainly been accomplished, an evolution which is able to promote the harmonious development of the Community as a whole. Nevertheless the path is still very long and, for a concrete acceleration, it is desirable that the inter institutional collaboration would be increasingly

enhanced: it is necessary for the successful outcome of the Community cohesion policies, otherwise there would be the paralysis of the political, economic and social growth of the whole European territory.

4. (Continued): the population involvement in the decision-making processes

The territories that make up Europe are very different from each other, not only from the political point of view, but also geographically. The morphological difference requires cohesion policies that, to be globally effective, must be adapted to the various areas.

For this reason local policies are more important and better suited to meet the differentiated needs than the more distant and less effective state policies.

At a time when a difference in terms of development not only within a State (for example north and south of Italy), but also within a regional area (urbanized areas and rural areas) does exist, in order to ensure an economic rebalancing effect by local policies, the participation of the local community in public decision-making processes should be encouraged. This has already been acknowledged for some time at Community level since, in Communication 2006/385, the Commission notes that *«Citizen participation is a democratic imperative; the commitment of local residents and of civil society in the urban politics is likely to confer legitimacy and effectiveness on the public authorities powers action»*.

Again the transport sector is a good example: in fact, in the process of identifying and carrying out major infrastructural works, the preventive involvement of the citizens would guarantee the effective completion, the optimal management, as well as the work protection. On the contrary, where there is no participation, the successful outcome of innovation is at great risk. Just think of the violent rejection enacted by the Val di Susa residents against the completion of the Lyon-Turin high-speed railway line.

Therefore, the perceived inefficiency of the cohesion policy system⁹ is due (not only) but also to a lack of initiative by local actors (citizens, informal groups, associations) that tend not to intervene in the decision-making processes concerning their territories because they are systematically incorporated by the major interest groups, or because discouraged by the use of resources, too often assigned to large economic groups (Manganaro, 2011: p. 7).

Briefly the good cohesion policy is the one which values the “participatory democracy” (Allegretti, 2011: p. 193), but it is necessary achieving a “grass-roots” involvement to protect local actors and “reduce the gap between the citizens time and the political calendar. Increasingly, local actors do not understand the limits necessary to the political agenda and the administrative or bureaucratic procedures” (European Commission, 2006).

Therefore, the participation of citizens is closely connected to the previously discussed issue of bureaucracy: these are two factors on which it is worth acting on, encouraging the former and reducing the second, in order to achieve the constant and harmonious economic growth objective.

⁹On this point, see the so called Barca Report, *Un'agenda per la riforma delle politiche di coesione*, April 2009, in www.confindustria.it. This is a report requested by the European Commission to a group of experts in order to highlight and overcome the critical issues of the Community's cohesion policies. In this document, it is noted that *«the current cohesion policy does not meet the demands of the current situation»* and hence ten key pillars for a deep reform of the governance have been identified, including: *«promoting experimentalism and the mobilization of local actors»*.

5. The "administrative efficiency" factor in Cohesion Policies

A brief concluding reflection on the good administrative organization issue as a precondition to give effects on the cohesion policies must be dedicated. The territory, as already assumed to be very heterogeneous, consists of virtuous areas and others less. In the former, public administrations are organized and efficient, while, in the latter, they are often characterized by organizational deficits and excessive bureaucracy (see paragraph 2 on the difference between north and south of Italy). Disorganization, at the administrative level (more or less high depending on the regions) is the cohesion policies "enemy" because it causes slow and even no growth in the less developed areas, against rapid economic and social developments in the most virtuous areas: just the opposite of what a good cohesion policy should generate.

Therefore, the inter-institutional link is a necessary condition but it is not enough; it is also necessary that each administration would be efficient in its organization and effective in its action. This, moreover, is imprinted into the so called Sapir (Sapir, 2004: p. 271; Manzella, 2006: p. 548) report which declares that enhancing a legal order and an efficient administrative system should be considered as a top priority for any convergence strategy within the Union.

The idea of the cohesion policies functioning for the good administration rules finds an initial normative response in Regulation no. 1083 of 2006 on the Structural Funds discipline: in fact, the Title IV, entitled not by chance under "Effectiveness", concerns precisely the quality of the administrative action. In particular, the art. 50, introducing to Chapter II, establishes in the first paragraph the possibility for each Member State to set up, on its own initiative, a national performance reserve (3% of funds) for the "convergence" goal and/or for the "regional competitiveness and employment" objective (De Gregoriis, 2011: p. 23).

Leaving aside (due to the synthesis) the complex discipline related to the structural funds, it should be noted that the commitment made at Community level is not unimportant, considering that the implementation of the structural funds policy progressively reduces, until their disappearance, the divergent situations between the Member States of the Union and between the areas within each of them.

This is the most difficult challenge launched by the European Union which, in order to be won, needs coordinated and joint action not only between the Community institutions and the Member States, but also between the national sub-State entities. In this context, public administrations play a fundamental role; it is nota coincidence and it is widely accepted that all cohesion policies are destined to fail if, at local administrative level, there will reign the incapacity to implement them, due to inability management.

What is needed, therefore, is a policy that makes public administrations, especially those in the most disadvantaged areas, more efficient and effective, respecting the general and indispensable principle of good performance. As has been authoritatively stated, public administrations need to be transformed from «*resource users*» to «*development protagonist*» (Manganaro, 2011: p. 12).

References:

Allegretti, U. (2011) “Modelli di partecipazione e governance territoriale. Prospettive per i processi di partecipazione nei comuni “dopo” le circoscrizioni”, *Istituzioni del federalismo: rivista di studi giuridici e politici*, N° 2, 2011, pp. 193-214.

Barca, F. (2009) *Un’agenda per la riforma della politica di coesione. Una politica di sviluppo rivolta ai luoghi per rispondere alle sfide e alle aspettative dell’Unione Europea*, [online] Available: [https://www.confindustria.it/Aree/NewsPub.nsf/94F6C881454709C3C12577BA00358C64/\\$File/Rapporto%20Barca%20_Capitoli%201%20e%205__ITA%2001_07_2010.pdf](https://www.confindustria.it/Aree/NewsPub.nsf/94F6C881454709C3C12577BA00358C64/$File/Rapporto%20Barca%20_Capitoli%201%20e%205__ITA%2001_07_2010.pdf).

Bassi, M. L. (2011) “Introduzione alla gestione dei fondi strutturali”, Cimini S., D’Orsogna M. (ed), *Le politiche comunitarie di coesione economica e sociale. Nuovi strumenti di coesione territoriale in un approccio multidimensionale*, Napoli: Editoriale scientifica.

Caranta, R. (2004) “Appalti pubblici e opere pubbliche tra competenza statale e regionale”, *Giur. it.*

Casanova M., Brignardello M., (2011) *Diritto dei Trasporti*, Vol. I, Milano: Giuffrè.

D. Atena, A. (1998) “Il doppio intreccio federale: le Regioni nell’Unione Europea”, *Le Regioni*, 6th.

D’Atena, A. (2007), *Costituzionalismo multilivello e dinamiche istituzionali*, Torino: Giappichelli.

D’Orsogna, M. (2011) *Le politiche comunitarie di coesione economica e sociale. Nuovi strumenti di coesione territoriale in un approccio multidimensionale*, (introduzione), Napoli: Editoriale scientifica.

De Gregoriis, L. (2011) “Profili giuridici delle politiche di coesione”, Cimini, S., D’Orsogna, M. (ed), *Le politiche comunitarie di coesione economica e sociale. Nuovi strumenti di coesione territoriale in un approccio multidimensionale*, Napoli: Editoriale scientifica.

De Rose, C. (2003) “Opere pubbliche tra Stato, Regioni ed Europa: note a margine delle sentenze della Corte Costituzionale nn. 302 e 303 del 2003 (parte prima)”, *Cons. St.*

European Commission (2006) *Communication 385/2006, La politica di coesione e le città: il contributo delle città e degli agglomerati urbani alla crescita e alla occupazione all’interno delle regioni*, [online] Available: www.eur-lex.europa.eu.

European Commission (2010) *EUROPE 2020, Una strategia per una crescita intelligente, sostenibile e inclusiva*, Brussels, 03th March 2010, [online] Available: www.eur-lex.europa.eu.

Fico, A. (2015) *Il trasporto pubblico nell’UE: diritti, mercato e politiche di sviluppo nell’Europa che verrà*, [online] Available: www.federalismi.it.

Ipsen, H.P. (1966) “Als Bundesstaat in der Gemeinschaft”, Von Caemmerer, E., Hallstein W., *Probleme des Europäischen Recht. Festschrift für Walter Hallstein zu seinem 65. Geburtstag*, Frankfurt am Main.

Magnani, C. (2006) “Le reti transeuropee”, in Mangiameli, S. (a cura di), *L’ordinamento europeo, le politiche dell’Unione*, Milano: Giuffrè.

Manganaro, F. (2011) “Aspetti istituzionali delle politiche di coesione”, Cimini S., D’Orsogna M. (ed) *Le politiche comunitarie di coesione economica e sociale. Nuovi strumenti di coesione territoriale in un approccio multidimensionale*, Napoli: Editoriale scientifica.

Manzella, G. P. (2006) “La nuova coesione europea tra processo di Lisbona ed allargamento”, *Riv. It. Dir. pubbl. Comunitario*.

Marra, A. D. (2015) *I fondi strutturali europei, la disabilità e le politiche regionali*, Frosinone: Key editore.

Sapir, A. (2004) *Europa, un'agenda per la crescita*, Bologna: Il Mulino.

Simonato, A. (2016) *Multilevel governance. Profili costituzionali. Il coordinamento tra Regioni, Stato e UE*, Padova: Editore CLEUP.

Vinci, F. (2013) *L'efficacia dei fondi strutturali europei. Processi e protagonisti al vaglio della sociologia dell'azione pubblica*, Milano: Franco Angeli.

Weatherill, S. (2005) “The Challenge of the Regional Dimension in the European Union”, Weatherill, S., Bernitz, U. (ed), *The Role of Regions and Sub-National Actors in Europe*, Oxford-Portland: Hart Publishing.

The evolution of inequality and economic growth in the International Community after the 2008 crisis

Ionut Virgil Serban^{a*}

Salvatore Puglisi^b

^a University of Teramo, Teramo, Italy

^b University of Teramo, Teramo, Italy

Abstract

After the 2008 crisis, the international community saw a rise in inequalities, such as income and wealth among social subjects. The tendency mostly believed was that the main causes of the economic crisis are precisely the growing inequalities developed in this new century. Moreover, governments could be the political "reflection" of the richest 1% - as this class is the one most able to support electoral campaigns economically - thus determining a vicious circle in the dialectical inequality-democracy.

Keywords: *Inequality; economic growth; International Community; Europe; United States; lobby.*

1. Introduction

The period following the 2008 crisis was characterized by the re-emergence of inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth in the various countries; therefore, the debate has resumed in terms of inequality and economic growth.

In economic theory, the idea that "the distribution of incomes can no longer be considered only as the final result of the general equilibrium of an economy, but plays a central role in determining other aspects of the economic performance of a state, has made its way. From a macroeconomic point of view, the distribution of wealth influences the production and the level of investments both in the short and long term, and is therefore a fundamental aspect of the development of an economy" (Viesti and Luongo 2011: p. 3).

The inequality can "undermine economic recovery because it reduces the aggregate demand, leads to an excess of risk exposure in the financial markets, reinforces particular interests that delay political reforms and prevent the adoption and implementation of counter-cyclical measures and, ultimately, undermines the effectiveness of the institutions. On the contrary, a greater level of equality in the distribution of wealth favors the creation of strong institutions that create, regulate, stabilize and legitimize markets, thus favoring the recovery from economic shocks. Stronger institutions, then, can act as an effective constraint on the abuse of political and economic power, fostering relations between the state and the economy and thus supporting economic recovery" (Viesti and Luongo 2011: p. 5).

Social conflicts do not influence economic performance only by "increasing economic instability and, therefore, by reducing investment or by paralyzing the ability to respond to an external shock of a political system. They can also increase the opportunity cost caused by violence. In particular, if, as has been shown, the crime rate increases with

*Ionut Virgil Serban. Tel.:004-0721-480-200. E-mail address:johnnutzserban@yahoo.com.

increasing inequality (Bourguignon 2009: pp. 2-11), the economic and social burden imposed on society by an increase in violence also increases, both in terms of direct costs (linked to example higher medical costs) and in terms of cost-opportunity, as a certain amount of resources will be "shifted" from other activities to prevention and fight against crime" (Viesti and Luongo 2011: p. 4)..

The inequality undermines "the ability to recover from negative shocks caused by external events, both directly and indirectly. The indirect effect derives from the impact of inequality on the set of tools used by policy makers to achieve certain objectives (monetary, fiscal, commercial and social policies). A high level of inequality, in fact, reinforces particular interests, thus increasing the power of the different present lobbies". (Viesti and Luongo 2011: p. 4).

In recent years, the tendency mostly believed was that the main causes of the economic crisis are precisely the growing inequalities developed in this new century (Grignoli and Șerban 2018: p. 10) and finds its major exponents in authors such as Giuseppe Stiglitz and Thomas Piketty.

2. The economical theories

This last author in particular has elaborated in his last book (Piketty 2014: pp. 14-28), an interesting theory about the factors determining the increase in inequality and highlighted the risks are inherent in this problem if you do not operate at the political level in a specific direction aimed at curbing amplification story.

The theory is based on a simple "inequality in the formula $r > g$, where r is the annual rate of return on capital, while g it is the annual rate of growth of production and wages; the author sees precisely in this expression the possibility of progress widening economic divergences among individuals. In fact, they occur better from the past, they are recapitalized more quickly than the analysis of the production process and of income; this happens because, even if you limit yourself to a reduced share of income of your capital, quota share will however grow faster than economic growth as a whole. This, therefore, is for the author the first and principal factor of divergence of economic conditions between individuals" (Piketty 2014: pp. 14-28).

From the enormous amount of data and graphs developed, Piketty points out that this phenomenon has characterized the main continental economies since the end of the nineteenth century, when the value of private assets was fixed on the sixth / seventh annuities of national income, up to the period between two world wars when the capital / income ratio fell to two / three years. The author explains this remarkable fall mainly with the destruction of the material capital (buildings, factories, infrastructures, etc.) caused by the war (the decline has affected in particular France and Germany and is attributable for the most part to the Second World War, because the destructive technology was more powerful); in addition, the decline in foreign portfolios and the very low savings accumulated during the two wars also contributed to this (Piketty 2014: pp. 14-28).

The trend then reversed, especially since the '70s, when there was a slowdown in growth and an increase in private savings (both for households, that is, the share of income not consumed in the immediate future, and the businesses, i.e. profits not distributed and reinvested), reporting the levels of the capital / income ratio very close to those of the pre-war period (among the European countries, the one with the lowest concentration of capital seems to be Sweden in the 80s) (Piketty 2014: pp. 34-38).

It should be noted, however, that although the levels of income / capital ratio are currently similar both in Europe and in the United States, "the two continents have

departed from very different situations; in the early 1800s in the United States, in fact, this ratio is less than half of the European one; this is mainly due to the fact that in America there are many more hectares of land per capita and consequently their value is lower than in Europe (at that time the company was predominantly agricultural and therefore the weight of land capital was significant in the composition of the national capital); moreover, immigrants did not bring real estate capital or their machinery, so they needed time to recover the gap of the component that the author calls "other internal capital" (housing and equipment for economic activities). However, in the nineteenth century, as a result of the decline in agriculture in overall production the value of land also decreases in Europe, while real estate and industrial capital begins to take advantage of, which will allow the United States to realign the European capital values / income" (Piketty 2014: pp. 34-38).

The second divergence factor is then represented by the process of removing salaries higher than others; according to most economists, this process seems to be attributable to "mismatching between competence and technology (in a society where there is little offer of engineers but the technological level of the moment requires a high demand for engineers, it is inevitable that the law of market determines a very high salary for this category of workers and consequently an increase in the differences with the salary of those workers not technologically advanced)" (Piketty 2014: pp. 34-38).

With reference to the divergences related to the income component of work, Piketty adds however another element that contributed to the process in question and which affects the top hierarchy of wages: the extremely high salaries of the so-called "superdirigents" of large companies (the phenomenon concerns in particular the United States and the United Kingdom and a little less continental Europe). For the author, it is precisely this that creates the greatest problems, since while mismatching could be solved by disseminating knowledge and skills (i.e. adequate education and professional training policies), the salary of superdirigents would seem the result of an arbitrary choice of the manager himself (as it becomes extremely difficult to calculate the exact contribution of his work), and therefore totally free from the concept of marginal productivity developed by the neoclassical economy (according to which the salary is proportional to the individual contribution to the company's product) (Piketty 2014: pp. 34-38).

Higher levels of income that are extremely high must also make the average income unreliable, which will inevitably be turned upwards, but which in practice will be more in line with the income actually possessed by the majority of the members of the middle and poor classes (Piketty 2014: pp. 34-38).

Besides the dissemination of knowledge, a factor that could help to reduce the differences is then the introduction of the minimum wage (which however is closely linked to the strength of the union institutions of the various countries) (Piketty 2014: pp. 34-38).

In this way the author puts into question the theory that had prevailed in the twentieth century, that is, the idea of Kuznets (Kuznets 1955: pp. 1-28) that income inequalities would be destined, in the advanced stages of capitalist development, to decline spontaneously, regardless of the policies adopted and the characteristics of the country, to stabilize at an acceptable level (this is due to the fact that in the initial phase of industrialization only the rich minority has the capital necessary for the exploitation of innovations in the industrial sector and therefore it is only this social class to benefit from it, but subsequently, with the entry of the "ex-agricultural" labor force in the industrial sectors, the benefit will also extend to the poorer social classes, which is why the Kuznets curve has the characteristic U-shaped inverted shape) (Piketty 2014: pp. 34-38).

Not sharing the theory of Kuznets, Piketty analyzes a series of solutions to the problem of the continuous growth of capital, stating however that only one is able to prevent the infinite spiral of inequality, ie the annual progressive tax on capital (which however can be effective only if implemented at a supranational level, since as a result of globalization even capital obviously no longer has borders) (Piketty 2014: pp. 34-38).

An analysis mainly focused on the United States, was developed by Stiglitz (Stiglitz 2018: pp.44-56) and shares almost the same line of Piketty, which highlights the "trickle down" policy, which he considers to grant the resources to the rich as they would then be "filtered out". Automatically to the rest of the population), although it was effective in the immediately post-war period, it is no longer valid since the '70s, when the inequality has once again increased. According to the author this is due not so much to "natural" laws (market laws), as to specific political choices made by the administrations of the moment (Reagan first and Bush then decided to abandon the Keynesian policies of economic intervention, to give space less intrusive policies that included tax cuts, reduction of public investment and deregulation of financial markets). The situation has significantly widened in particular after the 2008 crisis, as 91% of income gains went to 1% of the population (demonstrating once again that the policy of trickle down - implemented this time to save the banks - it did not work).

The concentration of income and wealth in a few hands cuts down domestic demand, because the propensity to consume 1% richer is much lower "than that of the earners of the lowest incomes; and lower question means unemployment. In the United States, the problem of inequality has also assumed an ethnic connotation: in fact, even though the white middle class has suffered from this problem, the major groups affected were however the African American and the Hispanic. Since in this country the working opportunities of the children are closely linked to the income of the family, this deterioration inevitably also affects the successive generations (the inequalities of results ie self-perpetuating)" (Stiglitz 2018: pp.44-56).

Stiglitz also warns that, given the tendency of other countries to follow the American economic model, the problem will soon assume global connotations; in fact, the data seem to confirm all this both for the already developed economies and for those in transition to a market economy (eg China, which had a low income inequality, today it shows a Gini index similar to that of the United States) (Stiglitz 2018: pp.44-56).

Like Piketty, the American economist also identifies the same factors of divergence in the component of income from work: that is, the increase in executive salaries does not reflect productivity (as evidenced clearly by the lack of correlation between manager's compensation and performance of the company) (Jensen and Murphy 1990: pp. 225-264; Bebchuk and Fried 2006: pp. 12-18).

However, still in line with the French colleague, also for Stiglitz the question of inequality is more problematic if related to income from capital: very often the goods that generate this type of income are not productive: for example, if a large part of savings is intended for the purchase of real estate, this choice does not increase the productivity of the real economy (Stiglitz 2018: pp.44-56).

Stiglitz then stresses that companies with greater inequality are less inclined to make public investments in those areas that improve productivity (such as public transport, infrastructure, technology and education) (Nistor: 2017: pp.68-78), as the rich fear that a strong government will, able to increase the efficiency of the economy, could at the same time use its powers also to redistribute income and wealth (Stiglitz 2018: pp. 44-56).

Moreover, governments could be the political "reflection" of the richest 1% - as this class is the one most able to support electoral campaigns economically - thus determining a vicious circle in the dialectical inequality-democracy.

The solutions proposed by the Author to counter the increase in inequality mainly affect four aspects:

- Reduction of executive salaries;
- Implement policies capable of maintaining economic stability and full employment;
- Guarantee equal access to education (in this way the pay differentials will reflect the differences in the capacity of individuals);
- Fair and complete taxation of capital (for example, eliminating favorable taxation of capital gains and dividends, and fine-tuning inheritance taxes) (Stiglitz 2018: pp.44-56).

Martin Feldstein, who explicitly argues that "income inequality is not a problem that needs a remedy" (Feldstein 1998: pp. 44-62), is clearly contrary to these positions. In carrying out this thesis, Feldstein (and also the other economists belonging to this vein) generally refers primarily to the classics, according to which inequality, although it may seem at first sight unjust, is nevertheless efficient and indispensable for the functioning of capitalism; inequality would create the conditions for growth because it stimulates the desire to invest and innovate. Starting from the twentieth century, this orientation will also leverage the Kuznets curve, ie the alleged transience of inequalities and the natural self-leveling of the latter over time. Finally, a further contribution will also be made by marginalists, through the idea that the rich participate in the production process to a greater extent than the other social classes, thus generating greater benefits to the whole society (this theory is often used to justify a treatment preferential tax for the rich, taxing the rich would in fact reduce their contribution to the economic system, thereby damaging everyone) (Okun 1990: pp. 78-93).

Feldstein identifies as a major mistake in Piketty's analysis the fact that he did not take into account changes in US tax law; indeed, it was precisely the changes in the American tax law that began in 1980 that gave the illusion of increasing inequality. The decrease in some tax rates has in fact led to changes in the choices of taxpayers, changes that have therefore increased the amount of income included in the statements of individuals who receive high income. Moreover, national income excludes the value of public transfers, including social security, health services and vouchers for the less well-off, which constitute a large part of the personal income of low and middle-income households; including these values, there would be a smaller gap with the highest incomes (Wood and Hughes 2018: pp. 77-83).

Ultimately, according to Feldstein, the problem in the United States is not that of inequality, but that of the persistence of poverty; but to reduce this problem, the confiscatory taxes on income and wealth proposed by Piketty are not necessary, but rather a stronger economic growth and a different approach to education and training (Feldstein 1998: pp. 44-62).

In an intermediate position we find Angus Deaton, who admits the possibility that inequality can be at the same time the cause and consequence of economic progress. If inequality also allows those below to improve their position anyway, then it may be acceptable¹; however, inequality must not derive neither from the choice of the rich to

¹ Generally, this opinion is based on the excellent idea of Pareto, according to which the situation of maximum efficiency would only occur when it is no longer possible to improve the situation of an individual without worsening that of another,

operate in sectors with high private but socially inefficient returns (as sometimes happens in the financial sector), nor from benefits from lobby or position income (Deaton 2015: pp. 145-151).

3. Conclusions

Although, inequalities were present since early times, after the 2008 crisis, thru big companies speculations the gap became more and more visible. The democratic governments tried to intervene in the process, but only the most powerful from the economic point of view succeeded to contain the damage. The other ones are still struggling to recover from the 2008 crisis. In some countries, the crisis was even more damaging being combined with some other factors such as adopting the Euro as national currency, emigration or enormous country deficit.

After 2014 some of the most powerful economies in the International Community started to develop a slightly growth but even so the inequalities continued to develop.

Finally, the peoples discontent regarding the increasing inequalities gave birth to another phenomena witch in years to follow might represent an even bigger fall of the western economies: the rise of the extremist parties and governments.

The annalists are predicting a new and bigger crisis to come in the near future. The question is: will the International Community be prepared to face this new challenge and overcome it showing that the lessons history taught it were well understood, or the extremists will seize the power and demonstrate that history is cyclical?

References:

Bebchuk, L.A. and Fried, J.M (2006) *Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation*, Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Bourguignon, F. (2009) "Crime as a Social Cost of Poverty and Inequality: a review focusing on developing countries", *Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad*, (September) Universidad de los Andes-CEDE.

Deaton, A. (2015) *La grande fuga. Salute, ricchezza e le origini della disuguaglianza*, Bologna: Il Mulino.

Feldstein, M. (1998) *Income inequality and poverty*, NBER Working Paper n. 6770.

Grignoli, D. and Șerban, I. (2018) "Propulsive Welfare for the "risk societies": a project for solidarity and communication in the social-health system", *Sociology and Social Work Review*, no. 2, vol. 2, 6-16.

Jensen, M. and Murphy, K. (1990) "Performance pay and top-management incentives", *The Journal of Political Economy*, XCVIII, 2, pp. 225-264.

Kuznets, S. (1955) "Economic Growth and Income Inequality", *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 1-28.

Nistor, G. (2017) "Education of Children: Access to Services, Factors and Conditions of Exclusion", *Sociology and Social Work Review*, vol. 1, no. 1, 68-78.

Okun, A. (1990) *Eguaglianza e efficienza. Il grande trade-off*, Napoli: Liguori.

Piketty, T. (2014) *Il capitale nel XXI secolo*, Milano: Bompiani.

Stiglitz, J. (2018) *Invertire la rotta. Disuguaglianza e crescita*, Bari: Laterza.

and on the Principle of Pareto (or Principle 80-20), from the name of the Italian economist who empirically highlighted how in Italy 80% of the wealth (at the time constituted by land) was owned by 20% of the population.

Viesti, G. and Luongo, P. (2011) "Disuguaglianza e Crescita economica", *Arête. Revista de filosofia*, no. 2/2011.

Wood, G. and Hughes, S. (2018), *Tutti gli errori di Piketty. Saggi su Il capitale nel XXI secolo*, IBL Libri.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

Title of your paper. Capitalize first letter (TNR, 16 pt, Bold, Centered)

First Author^{a*}, Second Author^b, Third Author^c (TNR, 14 pt., Centered)

^a *First author affiliation, City, Country (TNR, 11 pt., Italic, Centered)*

^b *Second author affiliation, City, Country (TNR, 11 pt., Italic, Centered)*

^c *Third author affiliation, City, Country (TNR, 11 pt., Italic, Centered)*

Abstract (TNR, 11, Bold, Left alignment)

Type here your abstract (TNR, 11 pt., Justify). It must be submitted in English and the length must have at least 200 words and not exceed 300 words.

Keywords: *Type here 5-10 keywords, separated by semicolons; (TNR, 11 pt., Italic, Justify)*

1.Main text (Section heading, TNR, 11pt, Bold, Left alignment)

Type here your main text, using **Times New Roman, Font size 11, Single space, Justify.**

The paragraphs continue from here and are only separated by headings, subheadings, images and tables. Leave one line space before the heading, subheadings, images and tables.

The **section headings** are **arranged by numbers**, bold, using Times New Roman, 11 pt, Left alignment.

Files should be in MS Word format only. Figures and tables should be embedded and not supplied separately.

References style

The references cited in the article are listed **at the end of the paper in alphabetical order of authors' names.**

References of the same author are listed chronologically.

References should be listed at the end of the paper. Authors should ensure that every reference in the text appears in the list of references and vice versa.

Examples of reference style are shown below. Please take care to follow the reference style precisely.

****For Books**

Books with single author:

Bryman, A. (2012) *Social research methods*, 4th ed., New York: Oxford University Press.

*Corresponding author. Tel.:004-07XX-XXX-XXX; fax:004-02XX-XXX-XXX. E-mail address:xxxxxx. (TNR, 10, Justify)

In-text reference: (Bryman 2012: p. 56) or, *for more than one page* (Bryman 2012: pp. 56-57)

Books with two or three authors:

Strunk, W. Jr. and White, E. B. (1979) *The elements of style*, 3rd ed., New York: Macmillan.

In-text reference: (Strunk and White 1979: p. 75)

Books with more than three authors (use the Latin abbreviation *et al.* in the citation rather than listing all of the authors):

Solomon, M., Bamossy, G., Askegaard, S. and Hogg, M.K. (2006) *Consumer behaviour: a European perspective*, 3rd ed., Harlow: Financial Times.

In-text reference: (Solomon et. al. 2006: p. 68)

Books of the same author(s) in the same year (use the letters a, b, c, etc., after the year).

Napier, A. (1993a) *Fatal storm*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Napier, A. (1993b) *Survival at sea*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

In-text reference: (Napier 1993a: p. 45) and (Napier 1993b: p. 57)

Chapter in a Book:

Holton, R. (2005) "Globalization". In Harrington, A. (Ed.), *Modern social theory: An introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 292-312.

In-text reference: (Holton 2005: p. 297)

****For Journal Articles**

Articles with one author

Schneider, B. (2014) "Achieving Citizenship and Recognition through Blogging about Homelessness", *Journal of Arts and Humanities*, 3(8), 79-89.

In-text reference: (Schneider 2014: p. 85)

Articles with two and more than two authors

Van der Geer, J., Hanraads, J. A. J., and Lupton, R. A. (2000) "The art of writing a scientific article", *Journal of Scientific Communications*, (163), 51-59.

In-text reference: (Van der Geer, Hanraads and Lupton 2000: p. 56)

****For Link / URL**

Council of Europe (2016) Prisons and Community Sanctions and Measures [online] Available: http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/PRISONS/default_en.asp [accessed 23 February 2016].

In-text reference: (Council of Europe 2016)

For more details, please see:

<http://www.hw.ac.uk/is/docs/Harvardguide.pdf>

Tables/ Figures

All photographs, schemas, graphs and diagrams are to be referred to as figures.

All tables/figures should be numbered with Arabic numerals. Headings should be placed above tables/figures, centered. Leave one line space between the heading and the table. All tables/figures must be numbered consecutively, all figures, and all tables respectively.

Under the table and figures, if it is the case, insert the *Source* (Left alignment).

Table no. 1. An example of a table

Type here the text	Column I	Column II
Type here	X	A
Type here	Y	B
Type here	Z	C

Source: Please follow the reference style

Page setup: B5 JIS. Manuscripts should have minimum 3.000 words, without abstract and references. The optimal size of an article is between 5000 and 6000 words, without abstract and references.

All submissions will be double blind reviewed by at least two reviewers.

Submission:

Submit manuscripts as an e-mail attachment to the Editorial Office at:

irssr@globalresearchpublishing.com

no later than 15th of March and 15th of October.

Authors are fully responsible for the entire content of their papers and they are assuming all responsibility for the ideas expressed in the materials published. The article submission implies that the work has never been published before, that it was not considered for reviewing and publication anywhere else.

